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GOOGLE, GADGETS, AND GUILT: JUROR 
MISCONDUCT IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
THADDEUS HOFFMEISTER* 
This Article begins by examining the traditional reasons for 
juror research. The Article then discusses how the Digital 
Age has created new rationales for juror research while 
simultaneously affording jurors greater opportunities to 
conduct such research. Next, the Article examines how 
technology has also altered juror-to-juror communications 
and juror-to-non-juror communications. Part I concludes by 
analyzing the reasons jurors violate court rules about 
discussing the case. 
In Part II, the Article explores possible steps to limit the 
negative impact of the Digital Age on juror research and 
communications. While no single solution or panacea exists 
for these problems, this Article focuses on several reform 
measures that could address and possibly reduce the 
detrimental effects of the Digital Age on jurors. The four 
remedies discussed in this Article are (1) penalizing jurors, 
(2) investigating jurors, (3) allowing jurors to ask questions, 
and (4) improving juror instructions. During the discussion 
on jury instructions, this Article analyzes two sets of jury 
instructions to see how well they adhere to the suggested 
changes proposed by this Article. This is followed by a draft 
model jury instruction. 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law. In addition to 
researching and writing on issues impacting jurors, the author edits a blog titled 
Juries. Prior to teaching, he served in the military, clerked for a federal judge, and 
worked on Capitol Hill. He earned his BA (French) from Morgan State University, 
JD from Northeastern University School of Law, and LLM from Georgetown 
University Law Center. His next article, Investigating Jurors in the Digital Age: 
One Click at a Time, will appear in the University of Kansas Law Review. The 
author would like to acknowledge Professor Nancy Marder and Dean Margaret 
Raymond for their useful and helpful suggestions. In addition, research assistants 
David Marviglia, Mike Porter, and Christine Seppeler were invaluable. This 
Article also benefitted from thorough editing by the staff of the University of 
Colorado Law Review. Of course, any errors or mistakes in this Article are solely 
the responsibility of this author. 
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As part of the research for this Article, this author conducted 
one of the first surveys on juror conduct in the Digital Age. 
The survey was completed by federal judges, prosecutors, 
and public defenders throughout the country. The Jury 
Survey served two purposes. First, it was used to determine 
the extent of the Digital Age’s impact on juror 
communications and research. Second, it operated as a 
barometer for the reform proposals suggested by this Article. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The theory of our [legal] system is that the conclusions 
to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence 
and argument in open court, and not by any outside 
influence, whether of private talk or public print.1 
In the face of ignorance—or curiosity—we “Google.”2 
Like most members of society, jurors have been influenced 
by the Information or Digital Age.3 In some respects, this 
impact has been positive. Today’s jurors, unlike their 
predecessors, spend far less idle time at the courthouse. This 
time is reduced because mundane tasks such as watching 
orientation videos and filling out juror questionnaires can now 
be completed online.4 Furthermore, by using email, the court 
can send out the jury summons5 and complete certain aspects 
of jury selection electronically.6 Another benefit of the Digital 
Age includes the creation of court websites that provide jurors 
with useful information about jury service.7 
However, the ease with which information is disseminated 
to and accessed by jurors has drawbacks. Just as jurors use the 
Internet to learn directions to the courthouse, they also learn 
definitions of important legal terms,8 examine court case files,9 
 
 1. Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Attorney Gen. of Colo., 205 U.S. 454, 462 
(1907). 
 2. Ellen Brickman et al., How Juror Internet Use Has Changed the American 
Jury Trial, 1 J. CT. INNOVATION 287, 288 (2008). 
 3. Id. (“[The Internet] has permeated every aspect of our society, including 
the American courtroom.”). 
 4. Nancy S. Marder, Juries and Technology: Equipping Jurors for the 
Twenty-First Century, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1257, 1271 (2001); MaryAnn Spoto, 
Online Juror Surveys Makes Process Easier for Courts, Citizens, STAR-LEDGER, 
Feb. 8, 2011, at 16. 
 5. Marder, supra note 4, at 1272. 
 6. See State v. Irby, 246 P.3d 796, 800–01 (Wash. 2011) (disallowing jury 
selection by email because not all parties were involved). 
 7. For example, the website for the Court of Common Pleas in Franklin 
County, Ohio, allows potential jurors to learn about juror eligibility, dress code, 
courthouse security, requests for excuse and postponement, terms of service, and 
compensation. Jury, FRANKLIN COUNTY CT. COMMON PLEAS, http:// 
www.fccourts.org/gen/WebFront.nsf/wp/658B17FFA9A383B0852574FB006DB07A
?opendocument (last visited July 7, 2011). 
 8. Brian Grow, As Jurors Go Online, U.S. Trials Go Off Track, REUTERS 
(Dec. 8, 2010, 3:23 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/12/08/us-internet-
jurors-idUSTRE6B74Z820101208. In one Florida case, a criminal conviction was 
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view photographs of crime scenes,10 and even download 
medical descriptions of powerful drugs.11 During one trial, nine 
of the twelve sitting jurors conducted some form of independent 
research on the Internet.12 In another trial, a juror enlisted a 
family member in his quest to unearth online information.13 
Advancements in technology also provide jurors new 
methods by which to communicate with others.14 In some 
instances, jurors have communicated with other jurors,15 
witnesses,16 attorneys,17 and defendants18 through social media 
websites and email. While sitting in the jury box, jurors have 
disseminated their thoughts about the trial and received the 
views of others.19 On certain occasions, this information has 
 
overturned because the foreman of the jury looked up the definition of “prudence.” 
Tapanes v. State, 43 So. 3d 159, 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). 
 9. See Bill Braun, Judge Closes Trial’s Internet Window, TULSA WORLD, May 
3, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/article. 
aspx?subjectid=14&articleid=20100503_14_A1_Inasig174831. 
 10. Robert Verkaik, Collapse of Two Trials Blamed on Jurors’ Own Online 
Research, INDEPENDENT (Aug. 20, 2008), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/ 
home-news/collapse-of-two-trials-blamed-on-jurorsrsquo-own-online-research-
902892.html (“A judge at Newcastle Crown Court was forced to discharge a jury in 
a manslaughter trial yesterday when one of the jurors sent him a Google Earth 
map of the alleged crime scene and a detailed list of 37 questions about the 
case.”). 
 11. People v. Wadle, 77 P.3d 764, 770–71 (Colo. App. 2003), aff’d, 97 P.3d 932 
(Colo. 2004). 
 12. John Schwartz, As Jurors Turn to Google and Twitter, Mistrials Are 
Popping Up, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2009, at A1, available at http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2009/03/18/us/18juries.html. 
 13. Commonwealth v. Szakal, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Nov. 16, 2009), http:// 
www.law.com/jsp/pa/PubArticlePA.jsp?id=1202435434751 (paid subscription). 
 14. See United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 298 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 15. United States v. Siegelman, 640 F.3d 1159, 1181–85 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 16. See, e.g., Kathleen Kerr, Attorneys: Juror Tried to ‘Friend’ Witness on 
Facebook, NEWSDAY (Apr. 7, 2009), http://www.newsday.com/long-island/crime/ 
attorneys-juror-tried-to-friend-witness-on-facebook-1.1217767; see People v. Rios, 
No. 1200/06, 2010 WL 625221, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 23, 2010) (noting that a 
juror used Facebook to contact a witness). 
 17. See, e.g., Thomas Zambito, Judge Declares Mistrial in Rape After Juror’s 
Email Ridicules ‘Doubting Thomases’ on the Jury, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 9, 
2011), http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-06-09/news/29654981_1_reasonable-
doubt-queens-prosecutors-mistrial. 
 18. State v. Dellinger, 696 S.E.2d 38, 40–42 (W. Va. 2010) (discussing a juror 
who failed to tell the court that she was MySpace friends with the defendant). 
 19. Christopher Danzig, Mobile Misdeeds: Jurors with Handheld Web Access 
Cause Trials to Unravel, INSIDECOUNSEL (June 2009), http:// 
www.insidecounsel.com/2009/06/01/mobile-misdeeds (“You’ve got jurors who could 
literally be sitting in the box running an Internet search while testimony is going 
on.”) (quoting an attorney). 
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been made available online for the general public to see and 
comment.20 
Although this Article focuses on the American judicial 
system, it should be briefly noted that other countries have 
experienced similar problems from the widespread use of 
technology by jurors.21 In England, a juror conducted an online 
poll to determine the guilt or innocence of a defendant.22 In 
New Zealand, a judge was so troubled by the possibility of 
jurors going online to conduct research that he initially 
prevented the media from printing images or names of two 
defendants on trial.23 Australia recently amended its Juries Act 
to raise the amount of potential fines assessed to jurors who 
improperly access the Internet during trial.24 
These new methods of juror research and improper 
communications, which have led commentators to coin phrases 
such as the “Twitter Effect,”25 “Google Mistrials,”26 and 
“Internet-Tainted Jurors,”27 are problematic. Such activities 
lead to mistrials, which prove quite costly both financially28 
and emotionally for those involved in the trial.29 In addition, 
 
 20. Deborah G. Spanic, To Tweet or Not to Tweet: Social Media in Wisconsin’s 
Courts, ST. B. WIS. (Mar. 5, 2010), http://www.wisbar.org/AM/Template. 
cfm?Section=InsideTrack&Template=/CustomSource/InsideTrack/contentDisplay.
cfm&ContentID=90872 (stating that in one trial, a juror tweeted, “I just gave 
away TWELVE MILLION DOLLARS of somebody else’s money!”). 
 21. See Afua Hirsch, Is the Internet Destroying Juries?, GUARDIAN (Jan. 26, 
2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/jan/26/juries-internet-justice. 
 22. Urmee Khan, Juror Dismissed from a Trial After Using Facebook to Help 
Make a Decision, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 24, 2008, 10:01 AM), http:// 
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/lawreports/3510926/Juror-dismissed-from-
a-trial-after-using-Facebook-to-help-make-a-decision.html. 
 23. See Edward Gay, Judge Restricts Online Reporting of Case, N.Z. HERALD 
(Aug. 25, 2008, 5:06 PM), http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id= 
1&objectid=10528866. 
 24. See Ellen Whinnett, DIY Jury Probe, HERALD SUN (May 9, 2010, 12:00 
AM), http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/diy-jury-probe/story-e6frf7jo-
1225864033798. 
 25. Ira Winkler, An Appeal to a Jury of Your Twittering Peers, INTERNET 
EVOLUTION (Mar. 24, 2009), http://www.internetevolution.com/author.asp?section 
_id=515&doc_id=173990. 
 26. Schwartz, supra note 12. 
 27. Daniel A. Ross, Juror Abuse of the Internet, N.Y. L.J. (Sept. 8, 2009), 
http://www.stroock.com/SiteFiles/Pub828.pdf. 
 28. See Amanda McGee, Comment, Juror Misconduct in the Twenty-First 
Century: The Prevalence of the Internet and Its Effect on American Courtrooms, 30 
LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 301, 302 (2009–10). 
 29. See Annmarie Timmins, Juror Becomes a Defendant, CONCORD MONITOR 
(Mar. 26, 2009), http://www.concordmonitor.com/article/juror-becomes-
defendant?SESSf8ff6c533a0d9d4898d6084f82d9a035=ysearch. 
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improper juror research and communications call into question 
whether today’s jurors can still function in their traditional role 
as neutral and impartial fact-finders. 
In light of the media attention given to this topic, one 
might quickly conclude that improper juror research and 
communications are pervasive and growing problems.30 
However, beyond anecdotal discussions, there is little academic 
research or studies to prove this conclusion.31 The dearth of 
legal scholarship may be due in large part to the fact that (1) 
the Digital Age is a recent and still evolving era and (2) juror 
misconduct is historically an under-examined area of the law.32 
The academic articles that address this subject primarily focus 
on the benefits of technology and how to harness it to aid in 
juror comprehension of the evidence submitted at trial.33 Thus, 
there is a possibility that despite the high visibility of a few 
cases, no systemic problem exists. 
In an attempt to resolve this question, the author 
conducted one of the first surveys on jury service in the Digital 
 
 30. Brickman et al., supra note 2, at 292 (“Although there are no published 
studies of how often jurors use the Internet to access information about cases, 
news stories suggest that it is not uncommon.”); Grow, supra note 8. Grow notes: 
The data show that since 1999, at least 90 verdicts have been the 
subject of challenges because of alleged Internet-related juror 
misconduct. More than half of the cases occurred in the last two years. 
Judges granted new trials or overturned verdicts in 28 criminal and 
civil cases—21 since January 2009. In three-quarters of the cases in 
which judges declined to declare mistrials, they nevertheless found 
Internet-related misconduct on the part of jurors. 
Id. 
 31. In the future, this author expects this area of law to receive increased 
scholarly attention. See generally Timothy J. Fallon, Note, Mistrial in 140 
Characters or Less? How the Internet and Social Networking Are Undermining the 
American Jury System and What Can Be Done to Fix It, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 935 
(2010); McGee, supra note 28. 
 32. See Bennett L. Gershman, Contaminating the Verdict: The Problem of 
Juror Misconduct, 50 S.D. L. REV. 322, 323 (2005) (“Although a considerable body 
of scholarship on the jury system, jury selection techniques, and jury decision-
making exists, the issue of juror misconduct has not been as closely or 
systematically studied.”) (footnotes omitted); Nancy J. King, Juror Delinquency in 
Criminal Trials in America, 1796–1996, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2673, 2673 (1996) 
(“This article examines two aspects of the jury system that have attracted far less 
attention from scholars than from the popular press: avoidance of jury duty by 
some citizens, and misconduct while serving by others.”). 
 33. See Marder, supra note 4, at 1269–74; Gregory J. Morse, Techno-Jury: 
Techniques in Verbal and Visual Persuasion, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 241, 247 
(2009–10); Paul Zwier & Thomas C. Galligan, Technology and Opening 
Statements: A Bridge to the Virtual Trial of the Twenty-First Century?, 67 TENN. 
L. REV. 523, 529 (2000). 
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Age.34 This “Jury Survey” was sent to federal judges, 
prosecutors,35 and public defenders to learn how they viewed 
the impact of the Digital Age on jurors. The questions in the 
Jury Survey focused primarily on juror research but briefly 
touched upon juror communications.36 Although conducted 
anonymously, the Jury Surveys were written to distinguish 
responses from judges and practitioners. Of the responses 
received, approximately half were from federal judges, and the 
other half were from either federal public defenders or 
prosecutors. 
The Jury Survey served two purposes. First, it was used to 
determine the extent of the Digital Age’s negative impact on 
jury service. According to the Jury Survey results, this effect is 
statistically significant. Approximately ten percent of the 
respondents reported personal knowledge of a juror conducting 
Internet research.37 In light of the difficulty of detecting this 
type of juror misconduct, this percentage probably under-
represents the actual number of jurors who use the Internet to 
research cases.38 The second purpose of the Jury Survey was to 
receive feedback from those who regularly interact with jurors 
in criminal trials. For the most part, the Jury Survey 
respondents agreed with the proposed reforms discussed in this 
Article. The one noticeable exception was the topic of allowing 
jurors to ask questions of witnesses, which was met with 
disapproval by most Jury Survey respondents. 
Obviously, a survey of this scope has some limitations. 
First, it only examined federal courts, not state courts. Second, 
all of the Jury Survey respondents were in some way affiliated 
with the federal government, as no actual jurors or private 
criminal defense attorneys were surveyed. Third, although 
 
 34. For another example of a survey covering similar issues as the Jury 
Survey, see NEW MEDIA COMM., CONFERENCE OF COURT PUB. INFO. OFFICERS, 
NEW MEDIA AND THE COURTS: THE CURRENT STATUS AND A LOOK AT THE FUTURE, 
available at http://www.ccpio.org/documents/newmediaproject/New-Media-and-
the-Courts-Report.pdf. 
 35. A few prosecutors refused to complete the Jury Survey because it was not 
approved by the Department of Justice. 
 36. See Jury Survey of anonymous respondents [hereinafter Jury Survey]. 
The Jury Survey is reprinted infra Appendix. 
 37. Jury Survey, supra note 36. 
 38. See Ralph Artigliere et al., Reining in Juror Misconduct: Practical 
Suggestions for Judges and Lawyers, FLA. B.J., Jan. 2010, at 9–10 (“These 
examples represent recent transgressions that were discovered, and probably 
represent just the tip of the iceberg of juror behavior.”). 
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every federal district was surveyed, the overall number of 
responses received was small.39 However, even with these 
drawbacks, the Jury Survey provides a good snapshot of 
current trends in the American legal system. In addition, it 
offers the views of those who are directly confronted with the 
problems of improper juror communications and research. 
Many of the responses provided by the Jury Survey 
respondents are highlighted throughout the Article. 
Part I of the Article begins with a discussion of the Digital 
Age’s influence on juror research and communications.40 Here, 
the Article examines the traditional rationales for juror 
research.41 The Article then discusses how the Digital Age has 
created new reasons for juror research while simultaneously 
affording jurors greater opportunities to conduct such research. 
This Section also examines how new technology has altered 
juror-to-juror communications and juror-to-non-juror 
communications. Part I concludes by analyzing why jurors 
violate court rules about discussing the case before 
deliberations or outside of the deliberation room. 
Part II analyzes possible steps to limit the negative impact 
of new technology on juror research and communications. 
While no single solution exists for these problems,42 this Part 
focuses on several reform measures that could address, and 
possibly reduce, the detrimental effects of the Digital Age on 
the legal process. The four remedies proposed by this Article 
are (1) penalizing jurors, (2) investigating jurors, (3) allowing 
jurors to ask questions, and (4) improving juror instructions. 
During the discussion on jury instructions, this Part analyzes 
two sets of jury instructions to see how well they adhere to the 
 
 39. Forty-one individuals responded to the Jury Survey. 
 40. The Digital Age has also impacted attorneys who investigate jurors 
online. For information on that topic, see infra Part II.B; see also Thaddeus 
Hoffmeister, Applying Rules of Discovery to Information Uncovered About Jurors, 
59 UCLA L. REV. 28 (2011), available at http://www.uclalawreview.org/ 
wordpress/?p=2735. 
 41. For the purposes of this Article, “jury research” refers to any effort by a 
juror to discover information about the case beyond that which was presented at 
trial. 
 42. Question 7 of the Jury Survey provided a list of potential solutions and 
asked respondents to select the most effective. One respondent answered, “[t]here 
is no one best method . . . [a] combination is most effective,” while another 
indicated that a combination of three distinct solutions was required. Jury 
Survey, supra note 36. 
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suggested changes proposed by this Article. This is followed by 
a draft model jury instruction. 
I. PROBLEM AREAS 
A. Research 
Although improper juror communications have raised 
numerous concerns in the Digital Age,43 the issue presently 
generating the greatest anxiety is juror research.44 While the 
underlying concept is not new, the methods by which jurors 
conduct research are.45 Since the late 1990s, jurors, rather 
than relying solely on the evidence presented at trial, have 
increasingly turned to the Internet to obtain information about 
the case on which they sit.46 
Research by jurors is problematic because their verdict 
must be based on only the evidence offered in court.47 Allowing 
jurors to decide a case based on outside information “violates a 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights to an impartial jury, to 
confront witnesses against him, and to be present at all critical 
stages of his trial.”48 Unlike evidence presented in court, 
attorneys cannot cross-examine, question, or object to 
information discovered by jurors online. As the Third Circuit 
noted in United States v. Resko, “extra-record influences pose a 
substantial threat to the fairness of the criminal proceeding 
 
 43. See discussion infra Part I.B. 
 44. See Schwartz, supra note 12 (citing a trial consultant who suggests that 
“juror research is a more troublesome issue than sending Twitter messages or 
blogging”). 
 45. One of the first reported cases of juror research is Medler v. State ex rel. 
Dunn, 26 Ind. 171, 172 (1866); see also Caleb Stevens, Lure of the Internet Has 
Courts Worried About Its Influence on Jurors, MINNEAPOLIS/ST. PAUL BUS. J. 
(May 10, 2009, 11:00 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/twincities/stories/ 
2009/05/11/focus3.html (“Since the inception of a trial by jury, jurors have had the 
temptation of researching cases outside the courtroom against judges’ orders.”). 
As a Jury Survey respondent indicated in answering a question regarding 
Internet research by jurors, “This is just another aspect of an old problem.” Jury 
Survey, supra note 36. 
 46. See Grow, supra note 8. 
 47. See Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472–73 (1965) (“ ‘[E]vidence 
developed’ against a defendant shall come from the witness stand in a public 
courtroom where there is full judicial protection of the defendant’s right of 
confrontation, of cross-examination, and of counsel.”). 
 48. United States v. Dyal, No. 3:09-1169-CMC, 2010 WL 2854292, at *12 
(D.S.C. July 19, 2010). 
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because the extraneous information completely evades the 
safeguards of the judicial process.”49 
This is not to say that jurors must refrain from relying on 
life experiences to interpret the evidence presented by the 
parties.50 Rather, jurors are not to make a decision based on 
outside or extrinsic evidence51 that lacks proper 
authentication.52 For example, a juror in a recent murder trial 
in Rhode Island went online to look up the definitions of 
“manslaughter,” “murder,” and “self-defense.”53 The definitions 
discovered by the juror, however, were derived from California 
statutes and case law.54 This juror’s actions ultimately led the 
trial judge to declare a mistrial.55 
The Digital Age, with its advancements in technology, has 
exacerbated the problem because, unlike traditional research, 
online research occurs before voir dire,56 during trial,57 and in 
the midst of deliberations.58 Furthermore, online research, 
which generally does not attract the attention of others, can be 
accomplished almost anywhere. Jurors only need Internet 
access.59 Some might think that online research is easier to 
detect than traditional research because the court can search a 
juror’s computer or handheld device. But this presupposes that 
 
 49. United States v. Resko, 3 F.3d 684, 690 (3d Cir. 1993). Research also 
suggests that extrinsic information can greatly influence the decision-making of 
jurors. Neil Vidmar, Case Studies of Pre- and Midtrial Prejudice in Criminal and 
Civil Litigation, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 73, 86 (2002). 
 50. See Bibbins v. Dalsheim, 21 F.3d 13, 17 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[A juror’s] 
observation concerning the life of this community is part of the fund of ordinary 
experience that jurors may bring to the jury room and may rely upon.”). 
 51. See Brickman et al., supra note 2, at 289–90 (“Research has demonstrated 
that jurors’ exposure to media coverage and other extrinsic information about a 
case can be highly influential to their decision-making.”). 
 52. See Dyal, 2010 WL 2854292, at *12; Ken Strutin, Electronic 
Communications During Jury Deliberations, N.Y. L.J., May 19, 2009, at 5 (“The 
potential prejudice to the integrity of the process implicates basic fairness 
embodied in due process, right to a jury trial, confrontation and cross-
examination.”). 
 53. Talia Buford, New Juror Policy Accounts for New Technology, 
PROVIDENCE J. (May 17, 2009), http://www.projo.com/news/content/TWITTER_ 
AND_THE_JURY_05-17-09_C7EA4AE_v24.3549604.html. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See Russo v. Takata Corp., 774 N.W.2d 441, 444–45 (S.D. 2009). 
 57. See People v. Carmichael, 891 N.Y.S.2d 574, 574 (App. Div. 2009). 
 58. See State v. Aguillar, 230 P.3d 358, 359 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010). 
 59. See Commonwealth v. McCaster, 710 N.E.2d 605, 606–07 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1999). 
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(1) the court knows to check those items,60 (2) jurors would be 
amenable to such a practice, and (3) jurors did not access the 
Internet through public or non-personal means. To better 
understand and address the modern-day problem of online 
research by jurors, it is first necessary to take a step back and 
examine why jurors feel the need to conduct any research at 
all. 
1. Traditional Reasons for Juror Research 
Due to the nature of the adversarial system, limitations 
are placed on the information received by jurors. First, judges 
act as gatekeepers, controlling the flow of information to the 
jurors by limiting what evidence they may hear.61 Second, 
prospective jurors with pre-existing knowledge of the facts in 
dispute, the parties, or witnesses are generally challenged and 
dismissed by the attorneys or the judge.62 In choosing today’s 
juries, “ignorance is a virtue and knowledge a vice.”63 This lack 
of information has led to increased juror curiosity and 
confusion. In addition, it has left some jurors feeling ill-
equipped to determine a defendant’s guilt or innocence.64 
According to one legal commentator, “There are people who 
feel they can’t serve justice if they don’t find answers to certain 
questions.”65 These so-called “conscientious jurors” take their 
role as fact-finders very seriously and aspire to do a good job.66 
 
 60. Paula Hannaford-Agor, Google Mistrials, Twittering Jurors, Juror Blogs, 
and Other Technological Hazards, CT. MANAGER, Summer 2009, at 42, 44 (“It is 
very difficult to frame intelligible questions for jurors if the questioner does not 
fully understand what he or she is asking about or, for that matter, the responses 
of individual jurors to those questions.”). 
 61. See United States v. McKinney, 429 F.2d 1019, 1022–23 (5th Cir. 1970) 
(“To the greatest extent possible, all factual [material] must pass through the 
judicial sieve, where the fundamental guarantees of procedural law protect the 
rights of those accused of crime.”); Brickman et al., supra note 2, at 288 (“In a 
sense, though, the very existence of the Internet is antithetical to the idea of a 
controlled flow of information.”). 
 62. Gershman, supra note 32, at 349. 
 63. Id. Historically, however, this was not the case. For a discussion of how 
the Digital Age may resurrect the original notion of a jury in which impartiality 
only referred to the absence of conflict, not a complete lack of information about 
the parties, witnesses, or facts in dispute, see generally Caren Myers Morrison, 
Jury 2.0, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1579 (2011). 
 64. See infra text accompanying note 74. 
 65. Schwartz, supra note 12. 
 66. See Bridget DiCosmo, Judge Re-enforces Electronic Gadget Ban, HERALD 
MAIL, Jan. 22, 2010, at A1 (“Often, the jurors who end up causing problems by 
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But they feel unprepared to render a verdict that in certain 
instances requires them to decide between life and death.67 
Jurors falling into this category often “want to ‘solve’ the case,” 
and they think more information might help them.68 
The Ohio case of Ryan Widmer demonstrates how far some 
jurors will go to ensure that they make the right decision.69 In 
that case, the defendant was charged with drowning his 
newlywed wife, Sarah, in the couple’s bathroom.70 The defense 
claimed that Ryan found Sarah in the bathtub and 
immediately called 911 and started to perform CPR.71 
However, emergency medical technicians (EMTs), who arrived 
on the scene shortly after being called, claimed that Sarah’s 
body was dry when they arrived, which supported the 
government’s theory that Ryan drowned his wife and then 
staged the 911 call.72 A key question in the case was whether a 
human body could dry between the time Ryan supposedly 
pulled his wife out of the bathtub and the time the EMTs 
arrived.73 Several jurors were so concerned about this issue 
and possibly convicting an innocent man that, after 
deliberations ended on the first day, they went home, bathed, 
and then calculated the amount of time it took for their bodies 
to air-dry.74 
Another cause of juror research is confusion, which stems 
from a variety of factors.75 First, some of the more modern 
 
conducting their own research are the most conscientious ones, because they want 
all of the facts so they can make an informed decision about the case.”). 
 67. See Janice Morse, Long Road Ahead in Widmer Case, CINCINNATI 
ENQUIRER (May 22, 2009), http://news.cincinnati.com/article/20090522/ 
NEWS0107/905230364/Long-road-ahead-Widmer-case; see also Gershman, supra 
note 32, at 347. 
 68. See Jury Survey, supra note 36. 
 69. See Morse, supra note 67. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See Dennis Murphy, The Mystery in the Master Bedroom, MSNBC (Sept. 
18, 2009) http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/32860588/ns/dateline_nbc-crime_reports/ 
t/mystery-master-bedroom. 
 72. See id. 
 73. Morse, supra note 67. 
 74. Id. The actions of the jurors resulted in a new trial for the defendant. His 
second trial ended in a hung jury, and his third trial ended in a conviction. Janice 
Morse, Jury Finds Ryan Widmer Guilty of Murder, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER (Feb. 
15, 2011), http://news.cincinnati.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20110215/ 
NEWS010702/302150035/&template=artiphone. 
 75. See Douglas G. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury: 
Comparative Analysis and Proposals for Reform, 48 ALA. L. REV. 441, 553–54 
(1997). 
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crimes that jurors must consider, such as violations of the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)76 
or securities fraud, go “well beyond the general knowledge of 
the layperson.”77 Thus, jurors become reliant on the attorneys 
or the judge to explain the elements and charges. 
Unfortunately, both attorneys and judges sometimes fail to 
provide adequate explanations. 
Second, some jurors are unclear about words and phrases 
used at trial that often go undefined by the attorneys or the 
judge.78 Jurors have been discovered researching medical or 
legal terms like “oppositional defiant disorder”79 and 
“distribution.”80 In other instances, jurors have turned to the 
Internet to learn the definitions of uncommon words like 
“lividity.”81 The problem of juror confusion is compounded by 
the fact that many jurisdictions prevent jurors from discussing 
the case until deliberations and, even then, only with other 
jurors who may be equally as confused.82 
Besides being overly conscientious and confused about the 
facts at trial, some jurors are just plain curious.83 Like most 
people, they want to know why certain issues went 
unexamined and why specific witnesses went uncalled.84 
Furthermore, jurors are interested in learning about evidence 
objected to or deemed inadmissible.85 As one Jury Survey 
respondent noted, “They want to know all the things they think 
we are keeping from them.”86 
 
 76. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68 (2006). 
 77. See Thaddeus Hoffmeister, The Grand Jury Legal Advisor: Resurrecting 
the Grand Jury’s Shield, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1171, 1189 (2008). 
 78. See Jerry Casey, Juries Raise a Digital Ruckus, OREGONIAN (Jan. 13, 
2008), http://blog.oregonlive.com/washingtoncounty/2008/01/juries_raise_a_ 
digital_ruckus.html. 
 79. Wardlaw v. State, 971 A.2d 331, 334 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009). 
 80. United States v. Bristol-Mártir, 570 F.3d 29, 37 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 81. Del Quentin Wilber, With Social Networking, Justice Not So Blind, WASH. 
POST, Jan. 9, 2010, at C1. 
 82. See infra text accompanying notes 121–24. 
 83. See, e.g., Jeffrey T. Frederick, You, the Jury, and the Internet, BRIEF, 
Winter 2010, at 12, 12 (quoting a juror who explained his misconduct by stating, 
“Well, I was curious.”). 
 84. See Strutin, supra note 52 (“More powerful than any rule of courtroom 
conduct are human curiosity and the overwhelming need to share our 
experiences.”). 
 85. See Susan J. Silvernail, Internet Surfing Jurors, ALA. ASS’N FOR JUST. J., 
Fall 2008, at 49, 49 (“Judge Vowell says he has observed a change in juror’s [sic] 
attitudes about wanting more information about the cases.”). 
 86. Jury Survey, supra note 36. 
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2. Modern-Day Reasons for Juror Research 
In addition to the traditional grounds for juror research, 
the Digital Age has created new opportunities and reasons for 
jurors to seek information outside of the courtroom. First, in 
the Digital Age, Internet usage has become increasingly 
common and popular.87 As a result, more people have grown 
accustomed to and reliant on it.88 In fact, “going online” to find 
information has become almost instinctive, something people 
do without giving it much thought.89 For many, the customary 
preparation for, or follow-up after, meeting a new person, 
either professionally or socially, is to research that person by 
“Googling” or “Facebooking” him or her.90 This practice does 
not necessarily cease because someone is serving as a juror. 
When jurors initially see the judge,91 parties,92 attorneys,93 and 
witnesses,94 they want to know more about these individuals, 
and, to do this, they go online to find information. 
Second, the Internet makes research by jurors much easier 
to accomplish. According to one state bar journal, “Jurors have 
 
 87. For current information on the number of individuals using the Internet, 
see Internet Usage Statistics: The Internet Big Picture, INTERNET WORLD STATS, 
http://internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last updated Oct. 6, 2011) (estimating 
that 78.3% of the North American population uses the Internet); see also Michael 
K. Kiernan & Samuel E. Cooley, Juror Misconduct in the Age of Social 
Networking 2 (July 28, 2011) (unpublished presentation), available at 
http://www.thefederation.org/documents/18.Juror%20Misconduct%20and%20Soci
al%20Media-Kiernan.pdf. 
 88. See Nora Lockwood Tooher, Tackling Juror Internet Use, LAWS. USA, 
Mar. 24, 2009 (“There’s a whole generation of people for whom twittering is as 
natural as breathing.”) (quoting litigation consultant Ken Broda-Bahm). 
 89. Michelle Lore, Facing Down Facebook: Social Media Use and Juries, 
MINN. LAW. (June 14, 2010), http://minnlawyer.com/2010/06/14/facing-down-
facebook-social-media-use-and-juries (“I emphasize [that jurors should not 
investigate cases] because I think it’s almost becoming natural to [go to websites 
to] satisfy your curiosity and get answers.”) (second alteration in original) 
(quoting a judge); see also Ellen Lee, Pew Survey: Half of Us Have Looked Up 
People We Know on Internet, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 17, 2007, at E1, available at 
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2007/12/17/BUKETSUFG.DTL 
(“About half of the online adult population has looked up themselves or someone 
else online.”). 
 90. See Brickman et al., supra note 2, at 288 (“[M]any people automatically 
search the Internet when confronted with a new name, subject, idea or other 
stimulus.”). 
 91. Email Interview with Jake Durling (Nov. 10, 2011). 
 92. See Russo v. Takata Corp., 774 N.W.2d 441 (S.D. 2009). 
 93. See Henry Gottlieb, Should You Design Your Firm’s Web Site with Jurors 
in Mind?, N.J. L.J., Jan. 2, 2007, at 29. 
 94. Id. 
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the capability instantaneously to . . . look up facts and 
information during breaks, at home, or even in the jury 
room.”95 If a juror has a question about an issue that arose in 
court or wants to know more about where the alleged crime 
took place, she does not have to physically go to the library or 
crime scene.96 Instead, she merely needs to access the Internet 
which, compared to other options, is quicker, less onerous, and 
less likely to be noticed.97 
The ease of obtaining information from the Internet has 
also led jurors to more readily seek out facts on their own.98 
This in turn has made jurors less deferential to the person 
offering information in court, whether she is the judge, 
attorney, or witness.99 With the Internet, even a layperson can 
be an expert—at least for the moment.100 
Another reason for online juror research is the sheer 
number of news stories about trials, and the longer shelf-life of 
those stories. Today, even routine cases are now reported or 
 
 95. Artigliere et al., supra note 38, at 9; see also Eric Sinrod, Jurors: Keep 
Your E-fingers to Yourselves, TECHNOLOGIST (Sept. 15, 2009, 9:29 AM), 
http://blogs.findlaw.com/technologist/2009/09/jurors-keep-your-e-fingers-to-
yourselves.html (“It is reasonable to expect that the natural curiosity of some 
jurors and the ease and habit of Internet research might cause them to let their 
fingers do their walking into finding out about their cases outside of the 
courtroom.”). 
 96. Erika Patrick, Comment, Protecting the Defendant’s Right to a Fair Trial 
in the Information Age, 15 CAP. DEF. J. 71, 87 (2002) (“Because the Internet is 
such a vast resource, the potential exists for jurors to do independent research on 
matters of law with more ease and stealth than going to the local law library 
would require.”). 
 97. See Jocelyn Allison, Tweets Let Attorneys Know When Jurors Misbehave, 
LAW360 (Oct. 23, 2009, 4:18 PM), http://www.law360.com/topnews/articles/128603 
(paid subscription) (“[T]he sheer wealth of data available online makes it easier 
for [jurors] to look up arcane terms or dig up dirt on the parties.”). 
 98. See John G. Browning, When All That Twitters Is Not Told: Dangers of the 
Online Juror (Part 3), LITIG. COUNS. AM. (Aug. 2009), http://www.trialcounsel.org/ 
082909/BROWNING.htm (“As [an Oregon district attorney] puts it, the ease of the 
Internet and handheld technology ‘almost invite people to do extrinsic  
research . . . .’ ”). 
 99. Renee Loth, Op-Ed., Mistrial by Google, BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 6, 2009, at A15, 
available at http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/ 
2009/11/06/mistrial_by_google. 
 100. See Rebecca Porter, Texts and ‘Tweets’ by Jurors, Lawyers Pose Courtroom 
Conundrums, TRIAL, Aug. 2009, at 12, 14 (“Some have a compulsion to know and 
be viewed as an expert. In the privacy of their own homes at 2 a.m., they do 
whatever they want.”) (quoting jury consultant Amy Singer); see also Strutin, 
supra note 52 (“Our Internet culture has enlarged the knowledge base of anyone 
with a smartphone.”). 
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discussed on the Internet.101 Also, unlike in the past, 
information on the Internet about the trial or parties does not 
necessarily go away just because the case is out of the news 
cycle of the traditional media. This was noted by several legal 
commentators who wrote that a “year-old article in an out-of-
state publication will show up in an Internet search just as 
easily as a current headline from the daily local paper.”102 
Finally, some jurors unwittingly conduct research because 
the jury instructions are either unclear or outdated. For 
example, in Russo v. Takata Corp., a juror named Flynn 
received a jury summons that stated, “Do not seek out evidence 
regarding this case and do not discuss the case or this 
Questionnaire with anyone.”103 Flynn “did not recognize 
Takata by name or product line and wondered ‘what they  
did.’ ”104 Flynn also wanted to know if Takata had been 
involved in any previous lawsuits.105 Thus, he went online to 
investigate the company.106 
Flynn’s online research never came out during voir dire 
because the attorneys handling the case did not directly raise 
the topic with Flynn.107 Later, however, during deliberations, 
Flynn told another juror that during his Internet research of 
Takata he did not find any lawsuits against the company.108 
Shortly after reaching a verdict in favor of the defendants, 
Flynn’s actions were uncovered, and the trial judge granted the 
plaintiff’s motion for a mistrial based on juror misconduct.109 
The defendants appealed to the South Dakota Supreme Court, 
which affirmed the actions of the trial judge and also stated 
that “[i]t may well be that Flynn did not realize that 
performing a Google Search on the names of the Defendants 
Takata and TK Holdings constituted ‘seek[ing] out evidence.’ 
”110 
 
 101. Brickman et al., supra note 2, at 292 (“Virtually every trial is newsworthy 
to someone and can therefore end up on the Internet where jurors can easily find 
it.”). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Russo v. Takata Corp., 774 N.W.2d 441, 444 (S.D. 2009) (emphasis added). 
 104. Id. 
 105. See id. at 446. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See id. at 445. 
 108. Id. at 446. 
 109. Id. at 447. 
 110. Id. at 450 n.* (second alteration in original). 
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Unfortunately, the negative impact of the Digital Age on 
jurors is not limited to online juror research. Juror 
communications, which will be discussed in greater detail 
below, has also become a major area of concern in the Digital 
Age.111 
B. Communications 
For the purposes of this Article, juror communications 
occur either among jurors themselves or with outside third 
parties. Generally speaking, communications by a juror are not 
an issue if they are unrelated to the trial on which the juror 
sits.112 But if the communications relate to the trial, problems 
can arise. This is because most jurisdictions forbid jurors from 
discussing trial evidence with other jurors prior to 
deliberations and with non-jurors before reaching a verdict.113 
Yet, as with the prohibition on juror research, the restrictions 
on juror communications are not always followed. 
1. Juror-to-Juror Communications 
Traditionally, juror communications with third parties 
have raised more concerns than juror communications with 
other jurors.114 In fact, some reformers want to allow jurors to 
discuss the case among themselves prior to the commencement 
of deliberations.115 Currently, at least four states allow jurors 
in civil proceedings to discuss the case before the submission of 
 
 111. See DiCosmo, supra note 66 (“Society’s increasing dependence on cell 
phones, smart phones and social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter 
to stay in contact can pose a problem for court officials when it comes to keeping 
jurors from communicating during a case.”). 
 112. For a twist on this general rule, see Pablo Lopez, Juror E-mails Muddy 
Trial, MCCLATCHY (Apr. 16, 2010), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/04/16/ 
92318/juror-e-mails-muddy-trial.html. This article discusses a California judge 
who, upon being selected to serve as a juror, sent emails about his experience to 
his fellow jurists. “[L]egal observers say it’s not clear that [Judge] Oppliger did 
anything wrong. Jurors are allowed to tell others they are assigned to a trial. But 
the judge should have known better than to do something that could raise a 
possible objection, they say.” Id. 
 113. David A. Anderson, Let Jurors Talk: Authorizing Pre-deliberation 
Discussion of the Evidence During Trial, 174 MIL. L. REV. 92, 94–95 (2002). 
 114. Gershman, supra note 32, at 341 (“External influences completely evade 
the safeguards of the judicial process, whereas internal violations do not raise the 
fear that the jury based its decision on reasons other than the trial evidence.”). 
 115. See Anderson, supra note 113, at 123–24. 
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all evidence.116 Other jurisdictions are considering or 
experimenting with the idea for criminal trials.117 
Advocates of pre-deliberation discussions argue that they 
improve juror comprehension and focus the jury once 
deliberations commence.118 In addition, these proponents 
believe that it is naïve and unrealistic to think that jurors will 
refrain from discussing the trial with anyone until 
deliberations.119 “[T]he urge to talk about the experience of jury 
duty is a strong one, in part to release the pent-up emotional 
pressure inherent in the role of juror.”120 Thus, to those 
supporting juror pre-deliberation discussions, it is better that 
jurors talk with fellow jurors as opposed to family members or 
other improper third parties. 
Nevertheless, most jurisdictions prohibit jurors from 
talking about the case with other jurors prior to 
deliberations.121 This rule is in place in order to (1) prevent 
premature judgments, (2) increase flexibility during 
deliberations, (3) ensure quality and broad deliberations, (4) 
decrease juror stress, and (5) maintain open-mindedness.122 A 
strong belief exists, especially among the defense bar in both 
civil and criminal matters, that allowing jurors to discuss the 
case prior to deliberations puts defendants at a decided 
disadvantage, as they have yet to present their evidence.123 
Some also fear that discussions prior to deliberations might 
 
 116. These states include Arizona, Indiana, Michigan, and North Dakota. See 
Jessica L. Bregant, Note, Let’s Give Them Something to Talk About: An Empirical 
Evaluation of Predeliberation Discussions, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1213, 1215 & n.19; 
Joe Swickard, Michigan Jurors to Get More Leeway Under New Rules, DETROIT 
FREE PRESS, June 29, 2011. 
 117. William J. Caprathe, A Jury Reform Pilot Project: The Michigan 
Experience, JUDGES’ J., Winter 2009, at 27, 30–31. 
 118. THE ARIZ. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON THE MORE EFFECTIVE USE OF 
JURIES, JURORS: THE POWER OF 12—PART TWO 8–9 (1998) [hereinafter JURORS: 
THE POWER OF 12], available at http://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/15/Jury/ 
Jury12.pdf. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Marcy Strauss, Juror Journalism, 12 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 389, 408 
(1994) (citing jury expert Hans Zeisel). 
 121. For a discussion of the constitutional implications of banning juror speech, 
see id. at 409–14. 
 122. Anderson, supra note 113, at 95. 
 123. See Danielle Salisbury, Lawyers, Judges Doubt Jury Reform Will 
Fundamentally Change the Way Courts Operate, MLIVE.COM (Aug 13. 2011), 
http://www.mlive.com/news/jackson/index.ssf/2011/08/lawyers_judges_doubt_jury_
refo.html. 
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occur outside the jury room and without the presence of all 
twelve jurors.124 
Historically, the issue of jurors communicating with one 
another before deliberations received little attention because 
most courts viewed it as low-level or minor misconduct.125 
Although jurors in the past might talk about the case with each 
other while leaving the courthouse or discuss it during breaks 
in the trial, these discussions were uncommon occurrences and 
not considered grave breaches of a juror’s duty.126 Thus, for the 
most part, courts were hesitant to declare a mistrial based 
solely on jurors discussing the case before deliberations.127 This 
was especially true if the juror-to-juror communications did not 
occur in the presence of third parties.128 
The difference today is the impact of technology. Jurors 
can now communicate with each other via email and social 
networking sites. For example, in the corruption trial of former 
Baltimore Mayor Sheila Dixon, several jurors kept in contact 
during and after the trial via Facebook despite admonitions by 
the judge not to do so.129 
These new forms of juror-to-juror communications greatly 
increase the possibility that the interactions and discussions of 
jurors will occur outside of the jury room and be made available 
to third parties. For example, if conducted in an online forum, 
these communications can provide the general public—
including the parties trying the case—access to the inner 
workings of the jury room and privileged information, such as 
informal vote counts or details of closed-door deliberations. In 
the Dixon case, the defense attorneys were able to read the 
Facebook posts of the jurors.130 This jeopardized not only jury 
 
 124. See Anderson, supra note 113, at 105–06. 
 125. NANCY S. MARDER, THE JURY PROCESS 114 (2005) (“Most courts turn a 
blind eye to the fact that jurors do engage in predeliberation discussions.”). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See B. Michael Dann & George Logan III, Jury Reform: The Arizona 
Experience, 79 JUDICATURE 280, 283 (1996) (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
concern about “division among the federal courts of appeals on the question 
whether permitting juror discussions deprives the defendant of the Sixth 
Amendment right to an impartial jury”). 
 129. See Dixon Jurors Ignore Judge, Continue Facebook Posts, WBAL-TV (Jan. 
4, 2010, 8:34 AM), http://www.wbaltv.com/r/22117438/detail.html; Dixon Jurors 
Must Testify About Facebook, UNITED PRESS INT’L (Dec. 30, 2009, 2:37 PM), 
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2009/12/30/Dixon-jurors-must-testify-about-
Facebook/UPI-75451262201840. 
 130. Brendan Kearney, ‘Friends on Jury,’ DAILY REC., Dec. 3, 2009, at A1. 
428 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
 
deliberations but also the integrity of the legal system itself.131 
These new methods of communication also demonstrate how 
juror-to-juror communications can easily and unintentionally 
become communications to third parties—a much more 
problematic issue. 
2. Juror-to-Non-juror Communications 
While strong arguments exist both for and against 
allowing jurors to discuss the trial prior to deliberations with 
each other,132 few, if any, would suggest that jurors be allowed 
to communicate with third parties about the trial prior to 
verdict. Yet, despite this uniform disapproval, this 
communication still happens. Of late, the method of juror-to-
third-party contact receiving the greatest amount of attention 
is online communication.133 
For a variety of reasons, courts want to limit juror 
communications to third parties until a verdict is reached. 
First, there is concern about maintaining the confidentiality of 
jury deliberations.134 Having jurors post information online 
about ongoing deliberations or other jurors would hinder the 
traditional method of juror decision-making.135 For example, 
some jurors may not fully participate or might hold back their 
 
 131. See Winkler, supra note 25 (“One of the cases . . . involving Twitter 
demonstrates the potential for stock price manipulation if jurors tweet that a 
company is losing a big lawsuit. It also facilitates jury manipulation, if lawyers or 
other interested parties tweet back or learn how individual jurors are leaning.”). 
 132. See Anderson, supra note 113, at 121–23. 
 133. See, e.g., Douglass L. Keene & Rita R. Handrich, Online and Wired for 
Justice: Why Jurors Turn to the Internet, JURY EXPERT, Nov. 2009, at 14; Robert 
P. MacKenzie III & C. Clayton Bromberg Jr., Jury Misconduct: What Happens 
Behind Closed Doors, 62 ALA. L. REV. 623, 638 (2011) (“The fastest developing 
area in the realm of juror misconduct involves juror use of e-mail, social 
networking sites such as Facebook, and micro-blogging sites such as Twitter 
during trial.”). 
 134. See United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 618 (2d Cir. 1997); Strauss, 
supra note 120, at 403 (“This frank and open exchange by jurors, moreover, is 
critical to the effectiveness of the decisionmaking process.”); see also John H. 
Wigmore, A Program for the Trial of Jury Trial, 12 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 166, 
170 (1929) (“The jury, and the secrecy of the jury room, are the indispensible 
elements in popular justice.”). 
 135. See Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 13 (1933) (“Freedom of debate 
might be stifled and independence of thought checked if jurors were made to feel 
that their arguments and ballots were to be freely published to the world.”). 
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true feelings during deliberations if they know that their views 
will end up on the Internet.136 
Second, juror communications to third parties undermine 
the notions of due process and a fair trial by providing 
attorneys with “inside information” into juror decision-making. 
Consider this real-life scenario involving a juror in Michigan. 
At the conclusion of the first day of a two-day criminal trial, a 
sitting juror posted the following on her Facebook account: 
“[A]ctually excited for jury duty tomorrow. It’s gonna be fun to 
tell the defendant they’re GUILTY. :P.”137 The Facebook post 
was discovered by defense counsel’s son, who was running 
Internet searches on the jurors.138 The defense attorney 
reported the juror, who was removed prior to the start of the 
second day of trial.139 
However, it is not difficult to envision a different outcome 
had the prosecutor discovered the information. Also, a different 
defense attorney may have taken an alternative approach to 
this problem. Some attorneys might wait for an unfavorable 
verdict to reveal the Facebook post.140 Other attorneys might 
not report the Facebook post at all and instead approach the 
prosecutor about a mid-trial plea deal or use the information to 
revamp their trial strategy.141 As will be discussed in Part II, 
 
 136. See Note, Public Disclosures of Jury Deliberations, 96 HARV. L. REV. 886, 
889–90 (1983) (“Juror privacy is a prerequisite of free debate, without which the 
decisionmaking process would be crippled. The precise value of throwing together 
in a jury room a representative cross-section of the community is that a just 
consensus is reached through a thoroughgoing exchange of ideas and impressions. 
For the process to work according to theory, the participants must feel completely 
free to dissect the credibility, motivations, and just deserts of other people. 
Sensitive jurors will not engage in such a dialogue without some assurance that it 
will never reach a larger audience.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 137. Jameson Cook, Facebook Post Is Trouble for Juror, MACOMB DAILY (Aug. 
28, 2010), http://macombdaily.com/articles/2010/08/28/news/ 
doc4c79c743c66e8112001724.txt?viewmode=fullstory; see also Associated Press, 
Juror Who Blurted out Verdict on Facebook Fined $250, Ordered to Write Essay, 
CLEVELAND.COM (Sept. 2, 2010), http://www.cleveland.com/nation/index.ssf/2010/ 
09/juror_who_blurted_out_verdict.html. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Correy Stephenson, Should Lawyers Monitor Jurors Online?, 
LEGALNEWS.COM (Dec. 27, 2010), http://www.legalnews.com/macomb/1004089 
(noting that a lawyer “expressed concern that some attorneys might fail to 
disclose information they learn about a juror—keeping it in ‘their back pocket’ in 
case of an unfavorable verdict—and then use the information to seek a new trial”). 
 141. Richard L. Moskitis, Note, The Constitutional Need for Discovery of Pre-
voir Dire Juror Studies, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 597, 626 (1976) (“When both the 
prosecution and the defense can resist discovery of juror information, it is possible 
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information about jurors is rarely subject to the rules of 
discovery, and attorneys have a very limited ethical duty to 
report it to the court. 
The final concern with juror-to-non-juror communication is 
that the juror, by communicating with an outside party about 
the trial, increases the likelihood that the third party will 
influence the juror’s views.142 This is because most 
communications involve an exchange of words or ideas. This 
concept is reflected in People v. Jamison, where the court 
explained why communications between a juror and a third 
party are restricted: “[T]he real evil the Court’s instruction not 
to discuss the case was designed to avoid . . . [was] the 
introduction of an outside influence into the deliberative 
process, either through information about the case or another 
person’s agreement or disagreement with the juror’s own 
statements . . . .”143 Juror online communication to a third 
party, however, is somewhat different in that, depending on 
how it occurs, the juror may or may not receive feedback. For 
example, a Facebook post or a tweet on Twitter does not always 
garner a response. 
To date, the United States Supreme Court has not 
addressed the issue of individuals making online comments 
while serving as jurors. However, several state supreme courts 
and lower federal courts have taken up the topic. One of the 
first to do so was the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
in Commonwealth v. Guisti. In Guisti, the defendant was 
convicted of several serious sex-related crimes.144 During the 
defendant’s trial, one of the jurors sent an email to a 900-
person LISTSERV and received at least two responses from 
individuals on the LISTSERV.145 The juror’s email read: 
“[S]tuck in a 7 day-long Jury Duty rape/assault case . . . 
missing important time in the gym, working more hours and 
 
for members of the community to view the result of the trial as dependent upon 
which side enjoyed the advantage of juror information rather than upon impartial 
jury deliberations . . . .)”. 
 142. See United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 305 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Not unlike a 
juror who speaks with friends or family members about a trial before the verdict 
is returned, a juror who comments about a case on the internet or social media 
may engender responses that include extraneous information about the case, or 
attempts to exercise persuasion and influence.”). 
 143. People v. Jamison, No. 8042/06, 2009 WL 2568740, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Aug. 18, 2009). 
 144. Commonwealth v. Guisti, 747 N.E.2d 673, 675 (Mass. 2001). 
 145. Id. at 678. 
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getting less pay because of it! Just say he’s guilty and lets [sic] 
get on with our lives!”146 Shortly after the verdict, defense 
counsel learned of the email and filed a motion for post-verdict 
voir dire of the juror in question.147 The trial court denied this 
motion, and defense counsel appealed, claiming that the 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial had been 
violated.148 
In reviewing the defendant’s appeal, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court initially remanded the case to the lower 
court.149 However, it did not do so because of the email, which 
the court found to be “improper” and in violation of “the judge’s 
order not to communicate about the case.”150 Rather, the court 
remanded the case because of the responses the juror had 
received from those on the LISTSERV.151 The Supreme 
Judicial Court wanted the trial court to determine whether 
these responses constituted external influences.152 Upon 
remand and voir dire of the juror, the trial court ultimately 
determined that the responses from the LISTSERV were not 
improper external influences.153 
Goupil v. Cattell was another case that addressed the issue 
of improper online communications by a juror.154 Like Guisti, 
Goupil involved a defendant convicted of a serious sex-related 
crime.155 However, unlike Guisti, the improper method of juror 
communication in Goupil was a blog post, not an email.156 
Another distinguishing feature of Goupil is that the trial judge 
conducted a post-trial voir dire shortly after becoming aware of 
the juror’s blog posts rather than waiting until he was directed 
to do so by the appellate court.157 
In Goupil, the juror’s first questionable post, made prior to 
voir dire, was as follows: “Lucky me, I have Jury Duty! Like my 
life doesn’t already have enough civic participation in it, now I 
 
 146. Id. (second and third alterations in original). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 678–79. 
 149. Id. at 681. 
 150. Id. at 680. 
 151. Id. 
 152. See Commonwealth v. Guisti, 867 N.E.2d 740, 742 (Mass. 2007). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Goupil v. Cattell, No. 07-cv-58-SM, 2008 WL 544863 (D.N.H. Feb. 26, 
2008). 
 155. Id. at *1. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at *3. 
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get to listen to the local riff-raff try and convince me of their 
innocence.”158 In another post, made after voir dire but prior to 
the start of trial, the juror, who happened to be the foreman, 
wrote, “After sitting through 2 days of jury questioning, I was 
surprised to find that I was not booted due to any strong beliefs 
I had about police, God, etc.”159 
The defendant in Goupil argued on appeal that the juror’s 
blog constituted prejudicial extrinsic communication with a 
third party and that the juror was personally biased against 
the defendant.160 In upholding the defendant’s conviction, the 
federal court noted the state trial court’s extensive post-trial 
voir dire.161 During this voir dire, the trial court determined 
that no other juror read the blog or was even aware of its 
existence.162 The trial court also found that the blog posts did 
not discuss the defendant’s case specifically and that the juror 
did not demonstrate any pre-trial bias.163 The court also 
analogized the blog to “a personal journal or diary, albeit one 
that the author publishes to the Web and permits others to 
read.”164 The court stated that the defendant “surely would not 
claim that the diary constitutes an ‘extraneous communication’ 
with third parties of the sort that gives rise to a presumption of 
prejudice.”165 
As these cases illustrate, courts are less likely to disturb 
the ultimate verdict because of a juror’s online comments 
absent the presence of one of the following factors: (1) the juror 
discussed details of the trial, (2) the juror demonstrated a pre-
trial bias, (3) other jurors saw the information, (4) the posts 
revealed that the juror was considering facts not admitted into 
 
 158. Id. at *2. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at *5–6. 
 161. Id. at *8. 
 162. Id. at *7. 
 163. Id. at *8. The court noted: 
The fact that Juror 2 might have come to the criminal justice process 
with preconceived notions about the “local riff-raff” and even a mistaken 
understanding of which party bears the burden of proof in a criminal 
trial is, in this case, of little moment. . . . [T]he [trial] court reasonably 
and sustainably concluded that: (1) Juror 2’s comments did not relate to 
[the defendant’s] trial; [and] (2) Juror 2 understood the presumption of 
innocence . . . . 
Id. at *10. 
 164. Id. at *7. 
 165. Id. 
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evidence, or (5) a third party contacted the juror about her 
comments.166 
3. Reasons for Improper Juror Communications 
In some respects, the reasons for improper juror 
communications and research are similar. Like juror research, 
some juror communications occur because of a 
misunderstanding of the judge’s instructions.167 In State v. 
Dellinger, a West Virginia juror never told the trial judge that 
she interacted with the defendant via MySpace despite being 
asked during voir dire whether she knew the defendant.168 
When the defendant’s conviction was later overturned because 
of the juror’s lack of candor, the court asked the juror why she 
did not reveal that she knew the defendant and had interacted 
with him on MySpace.169 According to the juror: 
I just didn’t feel like I really knew him. I didn’t know him 
personally. I’ve never, never talked to him. And I just felt 
like, you know, when [the trial judge] asked if you knew him 
personally or if he ever came to your house or have you been 
to his house, we never did. . . . I knew in my heart that I 
didn’t know him. . . . [M]aybe I should have at least said 
that, you know, that he was on MySpace, which really isn’t 
that important, I didn’t think.
170
 
Many jurors also do not consider or realize that texting, 
emailing, tweeting, and blogging are prohibited forms of 
 
 166. Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, How Blogging Affects Legal 
Proceedings, LAW TECH. NEWS (May 13, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/ 
lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=1202430647333&slreturn=1&hbxlogin
=1 (paid subscription) (“When jurors blog about ongoing trials, there are several 
key considerations: Did the jurors discuss details of the trial? Did the jurors 
display a pretrial bias for or against one party? Did fellow sitting jurors read the 
blog or electronic communication during the trial and thus become unduly 
influenced?”). 
 167. Rosalind R. Greene & Jan Mills Spaeth, Are Tweeters or Googlers in Your 
Jury Box?, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Feb. 2010, at 38, 39 (“It seems, however, that many jurors 
do not see blogging, tweeting or posting as communication, or at least they don’t 
consider it to fall within the rubric of traditional admonitions.”). 
 168. State v. Dellinger, 696 S.E.2d 38, 40 (W. Va. 2010). 
 169. Id. at 41. 
 170. Id. 
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communication.171 Noted juror expert Paula Hannaford-Agor 
points out that, “For some, tweeting and blogging are simply an 
extension of thinking, rather than a form of written 
communication.”172 Not surprisingly, then, jurors continue to 
communicate with other jurors (prior to deliberations) and with 
outside parties (prior to the verdict) despite admonitions from 
judges.173 
Also, as with online research, some jurors violate the rules 
on prohibited communications because they have grown 
attached to the technological advancements brought by the 
Digital Age.174 For these jurors, going any extended period of 
time without communicating via a social media website, text, 
tweet, or blog is a challenge.175 This desire for constant contact 
is so strong that it can almost be categorized as an 
“addiction”—one that they cannot give up even when called to 
serve on a jury.176 Jurors falling into this category are more 
likely to discuss the case with others.177 
 
 171. Allison, supra note 97 (“It may seem obvious that you shouldn’t broadcast 
your juror experience live on Twitter, but even sophisticated people need 
reminders.”). 
 172. Hannaford-Agor, supra note 60, at 43. 
 173. Even some lawyers and judges have difficulty understanding the concept. 
For example, one lawyer-juror thought that he could blog about a case he was 
sitting on: “Nowhere do I recall the jury instructions mandating I can’t post 
comments in my blog about the trial.” Attorney Discipline, CAL. B.J. (Aug. 2009), 
http://archive.calbar.ca.gov/%5CArchive.aspx?articleId=96182&categoryId=96044
&month=8&year=2009. 
 174. See Jerold S. Solovy & Robert L. Byman, Confronting the Fact of Juror 
Research, LAW TECH. NEWS (Nov. 30, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/ 
lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=1202435852040 (paid subscription) 
(“[W]e cell phone abusers, we internet junkies, we believe it is our God-given right 
to be connected.”). 
 175. See Anita Ramasastry, Why Courts Need to Ban Jurors’ Electronic 
Communications Devices, FINDLAW (Aug. 11, 2009), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ 
ramasastry/20090811.html (“Citizens have become increasingly reliant on such 
devices and applications. Indeed, many use them incessantly, as a lifeline to their 
friends, relatives, and colleagues—especially when they are at meetings, 
conferences, or otherwise away from their normal office or home routines.”). 
 176. See McGee, supra note 28, at 310; Susan Macpherson & Beth Bonora, The 
Wired Juror, Unplugged, TRIAL, Nov. 2010, at 40, 42 (“[A]ddiction to Internet 
access is not limited to young jurors.”). 
 177. Ralph Artigliere, Sequestration for the Twenty-First Century: 
Disconnecting Jurors from the Internet During Trial, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 621, 639–
40 (2011) (“To some jurors, the cell phone, iPad, notebook, or other digital device 
is a lifeline to which they feel addicted. These jurors require constant 
communication with others on events and matters from the mundane to the 
critical.”); see also Cassandra Jowett, ‘Google Mistrials’ Derail Courts; Critics Say 
System Ignores Impact of New Technology, NAT’L POST, Mar. 23, 2009, at A1 (“The 
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Finally, in other respects, the reasons behind improper 
juror communications are completely different from online 
research. For example, some, like the jury foreman in Goupil, 
feel the need to constantly chronicle their daily activities to the 
general public.178 This desire by the so-called “Tell-All 
Generation” to put their lives on display to the world is not 
shed just because they are called to serve on juries.179 Rather, 
this change in daily routine may actually increase the appeal to 
reveal180 because jury duty “can in its own strange way be an 
escape from the usual rhythms of city life.”181 
Regardless of whether the rationale behind improper juror 
communications is similar or dissimilar to juror research, one 
thing is certain: The Digital Age has had a significant influence 
on juror behavior. With respect to juror research, the impact 
has been almost entirely negative. Save for the opportunity to 
become more like grand jurors,182 few positive attributes arise 
from providing jurors with better methods by which to conduct 
research. Arguably, even the staunchest advocates of the so-
called “Active Jury”183 would deem research by jurors 
detrimental to the legal process. 
 
modern addiction to instant communication appears to have given rise to the 
‘Google mistrial’—the use of new technology to inadvertently skew the scales of 
justice.”). 
 178. Artigliere et al., supra note 38, at 9 (“Some jurors will want to text what 
they are doing at any given moment and why they are doing it to friends, family, 
and thousands of strangers.”). 
 179. See Laura M. Holson, Tell-All Generation Learns to Keep Things Offline, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2010/05/09/fashion/09privacy.html (arguing that, according to conventional 
wisdom, “everyone under 30 is comfortable revealing every facet of their lives 
online, from their favorite pizza to most frequent sexual partners”). 
 180. Michael Bromby, The Temptation to Tweet—Jurors’ Activities Outside the 
Trial (Mar. 26, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1590047 (describing one of the 
few studies to track Twitter comments by jurors and prospective jurors). For 
examples of celebrities tweeting about their jury experiences, see Live from the 
Jury Box, It’s Steve Martin!, ZIMBIO (Dec. 22, 2010, 12:53 PM), http:// 
www.zimbio.com/Steve+Martin/articles/1StTKdTeaji/Live+jury+box+Steve+ 
Martin, and Debra Cassens Weiss, Media Atwitter over Al Roker’s Twitter Photos 
from Jury Duty Wait, A.B.A. J. (May 29, 2009, 9:08 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/ 
news/article/media_atwitter_over_al_rokers_twitter_photos_from_jury_duty_wait. 
 181. Ariel Kaminer, The Torturous Trials of the Idle Juror, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 
2010, at MB1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/03/nyregion/ 
03critic.html. 
 182. See generally Hoffmeister, supra note 77. 
 183. Steven I. Friedland, The Competency and Responsibility of Jurors in 
Deciding Cases, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 190, 219–20 (1990). Active juries are generally 
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In contrast, there is a growing trend in the United States 
to allow jurors, prior to the close of trial, to discuss among 
themselves evidence introduced in court.184 For those who 
support juror-to-juror communications prior to deliberations, 
the Digital Age—with its smart phones, blogs, and social media 
websites—is a boon because it facilitates this practice. As for 
jurors discussing the case with third parties prior to the 
verdict, little can be said in support of this activity. Similar to 
juror research, it should not occur, and the technological 
advancements that support this practice are a detriment to the 
legal system. 
The next portion of this Article, Part II, will discuss four 
possible remedies to address the problems raised in Part I. The 
proposed solutions are as follows: (1) imposing penalties on 
jurors, (2) investigating jurors, (3) allowing juror questions, 
and (4) improving jury instructions. These remedies take 
various approaches in regulating juror behavior. The first two 
rely on punishment and oversight, while the last two use 
empowerment and education.185 
II. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
A. Imposing Penalties 
The first remedy analyzed in this Article is juror penalties, 
which can take various forms that range from fines186 to public 
 
described as those that are more engaged in the trial process and allowed to ask 
questions, take notes, and bring the instructions or transcripts back to the jury 
room. Jannessa E. Shtabsky, Comment, A More Active Jury: Has Arizona Set the 
Standard for Reform with Its New Jury Rules?, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1009, 1011–12 
(1996). 
 184. See Anderson, supra note 113, at 92. 
 185. See Hannaford-Agor, supra note 60, at 43 (“Juror education at every stage 
of jury service should be the first and foremost preventative measure against 
Google mistrials.”). 
 186. See, e.g., Andria Simmons, Georgia Courts to Bar Jurors from Internet, 
ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Mar. 30, 2010, 6:54 PM), http://www.ajc.com/news/georgia-
courts-to-bar-420308.html. Also, if fines are indeed used, the court should 
consider imposing day fines, which “are based on an elementary concept: 
‘punishment by a fine that should be proportionate to the seriousness of the 
offense and should have roughly similar impact (in terms of economic sting) on 
persons with differing financial resources who are convicted of the same offense.’ ” 
John W. Clark et al., Social Networking and the Contemporary Juror, 47 CRIM. L. 
BULL. 83, 91–92 (2011) (quoting BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, HOW TO USE STRUCTURED FINES (DAY FINES) AS AN INTERMEDIATE 
SANCTION 1 (1996), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/156242.pdf). 
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embarrassment187 to sequestration.188 The common theme with 
all penalties is that once imposed, they make citizens less 
inclined to want to serve as jurors.189 The average individual 
views jury duty as a burden that pulls so-called “citizen 
volunteers” away from their jobs, families, and friends to 
perform a sometimes stressful, and other times mundane, civic 
duty for which they receive minimal pay, if any at all.190 In 
fact, it is quite common for individuals to think of excuses, real 
or imagined, to get out of serving jury duty.191 Once jurors 
realize that, in addition to the possibility of sequestration, they 
run the risk of being penalized, the incentive to avoid jury duty 
will only increase.192 Therefore, penalties should be a last 
resort in preventing juror misconduct. 
1. Contempt 
Contempt is one of the more common penalties for jurors 
who violate court rules.193 Once imposed, it allows the court to 
fine the juror.194 To date, at least one state (California) has 
increased its civil and criminal contempt penalties to address 
juror misconduct in the Digital Age. The recently enacted 
California law allows “punishment of jurors who electronically 
discuss confidential legal proceedings.”195 According to the 
 
 187. See, e.g., Ed White, Judge Punishes Michigan Juror for Facebook Post, 
YAHOO! NEWS (Sept. 2, 2010), http://news.yahoo.com/judge-punishes-michigan-
juror-facebook-post.html. 
 188. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 189. See Brian Grow, Juror Could Face Charges for Online Research, REUTERS 
(Jan. 19, 2011, 1:11 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/19/us-internet-
juror-idUSTRE70I5KI20110119 (“But penalties could also increase resistance to 
serving on juries. ‘It’s a Catch-22 for judges,’ said Thaddeus Hoffmeister . . . .”). 
 190. According to one Jury Survey respondent, “Because jurors are citizen 
volunteers, the least invasive approach should be used until proven ineffective.” 
Jury Survey, supra note 36. 
 191. King, supra note 32, at 2704. 
 192. David P. Goldstein, Note, The Appearance of Impropriety and Jurors on 
Social Networking Sites: Rebooting the Way Courts Deal with Juror Misconduct, 
24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 589, 601 (2011) (“With the knowledge that they could 
face fines or even prosecution for something as innocuous as updating a Facebook 
status or sending Twitter messages, people may go even further out of their way 
to avoid jury duty.”). 
 193. “Contempt” refers to “[c]onduct that defies the authority or dignity of a 
court or legislature.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 360 (9th ed. 2009). 
 194. See id. 
 195. Cheryl Miller, New Bill Targets Web-Surfing Jurors, RECORDER, Feb. 22, 
2010, at 1. 
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legislative director of the assemblyman who introduced the 
initial bill, “It’s really just the law catching up with technology 
when it comes to the sanctity of the jury room.”196 
Prior to exercising its contempt authority, a court should 
first determine why a juror violated the court’s rules.197 Jurors 
violate court rules for a variety of reasons.198 Some do it 
intentionally; others do it unintentionally. Some do it for 
personal gain; others do it in a misguided effort to better fulfill 
their duties as jurors. To discover the juror’s motivation for 
violating the court’s instructions, the trial judge should directly 
ask the juror. In most instances, the juror will be quite candid 
with the court.199 Many jurors openly state that they 
disregarded the court’s rules because of curiosity200 or a 
misinterpretation of the judge’s instructions.201 In those cases 
where the juror is not forthcoming or the court questions the 
juror’s credibility, the court should examine the context of the 
juror’s actions. 
After determining the reasons behind the juror’s conduct, 
the court should then decide whether a contempt sanction will 
prevent similar behavior in the future. For example, holding a 
juror in contempt for misinterpreting jury instructions may not 
curb similar behavior in the future. However, if the juror did 
fully comprehend the jury instructions but disregarded them 
anyway because she wanted to be the first to reveal 
information about the case on her blog, the court may want to 
consider sanctions. Finally, the court should weigh the long-
term impact of penalties on the legal system—one that needs 
citizen participation to effectively operate. 
 
 196. Id.; see also Eric P. Robinson, New California Law Prohibits Jurors’ Social 
Media Use, CITIZEN MEDIA L. PROJECT (Sept. 15, 2011), 
http://www.citmedialaw.org/blog/2011/new-california-law-prohibits-jurors-social-
media-use. 
 197. For a good discussion of when to hold a juror in contempt for violating the 
court’s prohibitions against conducting research, see Superior Court of N.J., In the 
Matter of Lawrence Toppin, LAW OFF. DONALD D. VANARELLI (Oct. 11, 2011), 
http://www.dvanarelli.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Matter-of-Lawrence-
Toppin.pdf. 
 198. See supra Parts I.A.1–2, I.B.2. 
 199. See supra Part I.A. 
 200. See Frederick, supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 201. See, e.g., Russo v. Takata Corp., 774 N.W.2d 441, 450 n.* (S.D. 2009). 
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2. The “Luddite Solution”202 
Besides contempt proceedings, the court may also penalize 
jurors by depriving them of the tools they need to conduct 
research or communicate with third parties. At present, a 
number of jurisdictions across the country restrict juror access 
to cell phones and the Internet.203 This so-called Luddite 
Solution, which was noted by several Jury Survey 
respondents,204 can take a variety of forms. Some courts do not 
allow jurors to enter the courthouse with any electronic 
communication devices.205 Other courts impose restrictions 
only during deliberations.206 
The latter policy appears to make more sense than the 
former for two reasons. First, depriving jurors of their 
electronic communication devices for an entire day can 
constitute a significant hardship and make jurors feel as 
though they are being controlled.207 Second, it creates a 
logistical problem for the court, which becomes responsible for 
ensuring that jurors have alternative forms of communication 
and can be reached by family members, friends, and employers. 
Both policies, however, lose effectiveness with trials lasting 
beyond one day. This is because jurors can simply wait until 
they get home to violate the judge’s instructions.208 
 
 202. “Banning all cell phones, I-Pads [sic], and laptops for everyone called in 
for jury duty is unlikely to work and will be viewed as a Luddite solution with 
little support in the jury pool.” The Honorable Dennis M. Sweeney, Circuit Court 
Judge (Retired), Address to the Litigation Section of the Maryland State Bar 
Association: The Internet, Social Media and Jury Trials—Lessons Learned from 
the Dixon Trial 3 (Apr. 29, 2010) (transcript available at http://juries.typepad.com/ 
files/judge-sweeney.doc). 
 203. See, e.g., Jury Survey, supra note 36 (“In the CD of Illinois jurors are not 
allowed to bring cell phones into the courtroom.”; “We take up their cell phones at 
the door.”). See generally Eric P. Robinson, Jury Instructions for the Modern Era: 
A 50-State Survey of Jury Instructions on Internet and Social Media, 1 REYNOLDS 
CTS. & MEDIA L.J., 307 (2011). 
 204. See Jury Survey, supra note 36. 
 205. Id. 
 206. See id. (“I require them to surrender cell phones and other such devices 
when they retire to deliberate.”). 
 207. Goldstein, supra note 192, at 602 n.108. 
 208. Allison, supra note 97 (“Courts can also ban mobile devices from the 
courtroom—some already do—though there could be some backlash from jurors 
accustomed to being in constant communication with family and friends. And that 
still doesn’t keep them from doing research on Google or tweeting when they get 
home.”). 
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Compared to the traditional methods used to prevent juror 
misconduct, the Luddite Solution appears to be extreme and an 
overreaction to the problems presented by online research and 
communications. For example, courts do not routinely deprive 
jurors of their radios and televisions even though these devices 
might be used to learn information about the case.209 Instead, 
jurors simply are told to avoid watching or listening to 
programs about the trial on which they sit.210 Even in rare 
instances of sequestration, jurors are not necessarily deprived 
of access to the radio or television.211 Thus, jurors should not be 
deprived of their laptops and smartphones but rather should be 
instructed that neither is to be used to research the case or to 
discuss it.212 
 
 209. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE ILL. COURTS, A HANDBOOK FOR ILLINOIS 
JURORS: PETIT JURY (2011), available at http://www.state.il.us/court/circuitcourt/ 
Jury/Jury.pdf (“YOU SHOULD AVOID NEWSPAPERS OR RADIO AND 
TELEVISION BROADCASTS which may feature accounts of the trial or 
information about someone’s participation in it.”). 
 210. Robert Little, Their Holiday Task: Don’t Talk or Listen, BALT. SUN (Nov. 
26, 2009), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2009-11-26/news/bal-md.jurors26nov26 
_1_pressure-benefit-jurors-informal-vote-counts (“The judge implored the panel to 
stay away from newspapers, television broadcasts and idle Dixon-related chatter, 
but few courtroom observers could imagine 12 people spending the next four days 
in Baltimore without encountering at least a whiff of the criminal case against the 
city’s mayor.”). 
 211. See Thaddeus Hoffmeister, Lifetime Off Limits for Casey Anthony Juries?, 
JURIES (Apr. 6, 2011), http://juries.typepad.com/juries/2011/04/lifetime-off-limits-
for-casey-anthony-jurors.html. 
 212. See Public Hearing Before the Mich. Supreme Court 34 (2009) (statement 
of Robert P. Young, J.), available at http://www.courts.michigan.gov/ 
supremecourt/resources/administrative/PublicHearings/051209-
PublicHearingTranscript.pdf. Justice Young stated: 
I have a theory about technology. We oughtn’t impose on technology 
more than we impose on similar activities we conduct without 
technology. . . . [W]e used to have newspapers, we used to tell people not 
to read them. We have television[s]—we used to tell people not to listen 
to them. So . . . why would we do more than instruct jurors that [they] 
may not use this newer technology to do research in the same way that 
they could do if . . . prior to the time we had Blackberrys and PDAs[,] 
they could have gone to the library and done this research. . . . I’m 
struggling to understand why just because we now have the availability 
of a library in our hands we should be doing more than saying you may 
not use that library whether it’s at a physical location somewhere other 
than the court or you can bring it in on a PDA. 
Id. 
2012] JUROR MISCONDUCT IN THE DIGITAL AGE 441 
 
3. Sequestration 
Of the possible remedies available, sequestration best 
ensures juror compliance. This is because the court has direct 
control of the jurors’ environment. While popular in the past 
and still relied upon in some jurisdictions for high-profile and 
capital trials, sequestration is not widely used today.213 Despite 
this fact, some believe that sequestration, because of its 
deterrent effect, should be mentioned to all jurors upon initial 
empanelment.214 
Sequestration is generally disfavored because of the 
burden it places on courts and jurors.215 It is expensive for a 
court to lodge jurors throughout a trial.216 At present, courts 
are struggling to pay the nominal fee given to jurors for their 
service.217 Additional costs might break the budget of many 
jurisdictions.218 Sequestration also generally results in a longer 
jury selection process, as many potential jurors will attempt to 
get excused from jury service because they either cannot or 
prefer not to be away from their families and friends for an 
extended amount of time.219 For the most part, jurors view 
 
 213. See King, supra note 32, at 2713 (“Eventually, the sluggish pace of trials 
prompted courts to abandon their first line of defense against jury misconduct: 
sequestration.”); see also Marcy Strauss, Sequestration, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 63, 71–
72 (1996). 
 214. Fallon, supra note 31, at 966; see also Artigliere, supra note 177, at 643 
(quoting a Florida judge as saying, “I have two ways I can do this. I can lock you 
up—that’s called sequestering, it’s a fancy word for locking you up—during the 
course of the trial, or I can have you promise me that you will strictly abide by my 
instructions during the trial . . . .”). 
 215. See Jury Survey, supra note 36 (“Sequestration [is] very burdensome on 
jurors . . . [and] very expensive for taxpayers.”). 
 216. See, e.g., Rob Shaw, Costs of Casey Anthony Case Not Just Measured in 
Dollars, TAMPA BAY ONLINE (July 17, 2011), http://www2.tbo.com/news/breaking-
news/2011/jul/17/13/costs-of-casey-anthony-case-not-just-measured-in-d-ar-244247 
(“It cost more than $30,000 just to feed the Pinellas County jury for six weeks. . . . 
The tab was more than $112,000 to put the jurors up at a nice hotel.”). 
 217. See, e.g., Joe Guillen, Cuyahoga Cuts Jurors’ Daily Pay, PLAIN DEALER, 
May 14, 2009, at B2 (discussing decisions in several Ohio counties to reduce juror 
pay in order to help balance county budgets). 
 218. See, e.g., Bob Egelko, Budget Woes Slow the Wheels of Justice; Crisis 
Could Lead to 200 Layoffs, Close 25 S.F. Courts, S.F. CHRON., July 19, 2011, at A1 
(illustrating that a San Francisco budget crisis will result in the city laying off 
forty percent of its Superior Court employees). 
 219. King, supra note 32, at 2713 (“Judges concerned about jury competence 
recognized that sequestration deterred many potential ‘reliable’ jurors from 
serving as jurors.”); Charles H. Whitebread, Selecting Juries in High Profile 
Criminal Cases, 2 GREEN BAG 2D 191, 195–96 (1999). 
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sequestration negatively because they must live in a controlled 
environment away from their residences and those with whom 
they normally associate.220 
One twist to the old idea of sequestration is “virtual 
sequestration.”221 Here, jurors remain in their own homes but 
consent to having their access to the Internet and certain 
electronic devices either monitored or blocked.222 While 
arguably less burdensome and probably less expensive than 
regular sequestration, virtual sequestration may be viewed by 
some as online snooping and overly intrusive.223 However, as 
discussed next, some attorneys currently conduct an informal 
version of virtual sequestration by investigating and 
monitoring the online activities of jurors. 
B. Investigating Jurors 
Besides imposing penalties, investigating jurors also works 
to limit improper juror research and communications. These 
investigations are carried out primarily by attorneys or their 
staff and occur via the Internet.224 Most people have at least 
one online reference or “footprint,” whether put there 
personally or by someone else.225 Attorneys investigate 
 
 220. See Strauss, supra note 213, at 106–07. 
 221. This idea was recently raised at a conference. See Professor Eric Chaffee, 
Address at the Legal Scholarship Conference at the University of Toledo College 
of Law (June 2010). This author is unaware of any jurisdiction that has 
implemented virtual sequestration. However, at least one enterprising district 
attorney in Texas is considering offering jurors free access to the court’s wireless 
network in exchange for temporarily “friending” his office, which, depending on 
privacy settings, would allow the DA to monitor the juror’s Facebook account. See 
Ana Campoy & Ashby Jones, Searching for Details Online, Lawyers Facebook the 
Jury, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 2011, at A2; see also Jack Zemlicka, Judges in 
Wisconsin Set Electronic Media Limits for Juries, WIS. L.J., May 10, 2010 (citing a 
circuit judge as suggesting that judges “could ask jurors engaged in social 
networking that, if empanelled, would they consent to being friended by the 
court”). 
 222. Address by Eric Chaffee, supra note 221. 
 223. Julie Kay, Social Networking Sites Help Vet Jurors, LAW TECH. NEWS 
(Aug. 13, 2008), http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN. 
jsp?id=1202423725315 (paid subscription). 
 224. See Jonathan M. Redgrave & Jason J. Stover, The Information Age, Part 
II: Juror Investigation on the Internet—Implications for the Trial Lawyer, 2 
SEDONA CONF. J. 211, 211 (2001). 
 225. Allison, supra note 97 (“Everybody has something on them on the Web, 
and everybody can look it up.”) (quoting attorney Daniel Ross). 
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jurors226 by searching the jurors’ digital trails227 or Internet 
footprints.228 This practice, which occurs before, during, and 
after trials, can take various forms.229 The most basic level is a 
name search on an Internet search engine.230 However, many 
attorneys employ far more sophisticated procedures such as 
extracting information from social networking sites and 
databases231 and monitoring the online activities of jurors.232 
Recently, online investigation of jurors has gained 
increased acceptance among practitioners.233 Moreover, courts 
and state bar associations have both approved234 and 
encouraged the practice.235 Proponents argue that the online 
investigation of jurors by attorneys has uncovered numerous 
instances of juror misconduct.236 Furthermore, proponents 
claim that once jurors realize that many of their voir dire 
answers can be verified, they either will be more truthful or 
will request dismissal from the case.237 Finally, jurors who 
 
 226. For a discussion of judges investigating jurors, see John DiMotto, Judges 
and the Internet—Juror Information, BENCH & B. EXPERIENCES (Apr. 28, 2010), 
http://johndimotto.blogspot.com/2010/04/judges-and-internet-juror-
information.html (the blog of a Milwaukee County Circuit Court Judge). 
 227. Hoffmeister, supra note 40, at 32; cf. Tresa Baldas, Open Web, Insert Foot, 
NAT’L L.J. (May 10, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id= 
1202457874016&slreturn=1 (discussing lawyers “talking trash about clients—
online, leaving a digital trail for bar counsel to follow”). 
 228. Jeffrey T. Frederick, Seasoned Jury Expert Shares Secrets of Voir Dire 
and Jury Selection, YOURABA (Mar. 2011), http://www.americanbar.org/ 
publications/youraba/201103article01.html; see also Kay, supra note 223. 
 229. See Zemlicka, supra note 221 (“Since the explosion of social networking, [a 
Wisconsin attorney] regularly researches jurors and monitors their online activity 
during lengthy trials. ‘It’s not unusual for someone in my office to run the name of 
a juror, if we get them ahead of time, through Google, Twitter or Facebook,’ he 
said.”) (internal quotation marks added). 
 230. Hoffmeister, supra note 40. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id.; see also Kay, supra note 223. 
 233. Hoffmeister, supra note 40. 
 234. See, e.g., Carino v. Muenzen, No. A-5491-08T1, 2010 N.J. Super. Unpub. 
LEXIS 2154, at *26–27 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 30, 2010) (admonishing a 
trial judge for forbidding counsel from investigating jurors online during jury 
selection); N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 743 
(2011) [hereinafter N.Y. Ethics Opinion] (“It is proper and ethical . . . for a lawyer 
to undertake a pretrial search of a prospective juror’s social networking site.”). 
 235. See, e.g., Johnson v. McCullough, 306 S.W.3d 551, 558–59 (Mo. 2010) 
(encouraging attorneys to prevent retrials by investigating jurors’ litigation 
history prior to empanelling the jury). 
 236. Hoffmeister, supra note 40. 
 237. Molly McDonough, Rogue Jurors, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2006, at 39, 43 (“Because 
judges are emphasizing [criminal background] checks [for jurors] . . . more jurors 
drop out before the jury is formally seated and thus ‘fewer and fewer people are 
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know that their online activities will be investigated are more 
likely to follow court instructions throughout the trial.238 
While online investigation of jurors will help reduce 
incidents of juror misconduct associated with the Digital Age, 
the practice has its limitations. First, as with imposing 
penalties, investigating jurors does not address the reasons 
that jurors violate court rules.239 Therefore, it does little to 
combat the root causes of juror misconduct. Second, unless 
courts impose virtual sequestration240 by requiring jurors to 
make all of their online activities and communications subject 
to review, certain misconduct will go undetected. 
Third, and most problematic, looking for information about 
jurors online raises privacy issues. According to Judge Richard 
Posner, “Most people dread jury duty—partly because of 
privacy concerns.”241 The following quotation reflects the view 
held by many on this issue: “The Internet in so many areas 
creates an extraordinary conflict between the desire for 
information and the desire for privacy.”242 Thus, as more 
citizens realize that jury duty now includes online background 
checks and monitoring, it is likely that the low juror summons 
response rates in certain parts of the country will only get 
worse.243 
Finally, there is a concern that attorneys will not reveal 
juror misconduct that they discover to the court or opposing 
counsel, especially if they think that a particular juror is 
advantageous to their side or if they agree with the overall 
outcome of the trial.244 At present, few courts require attorneys 
 
coming up with a criminal record in contradiction of their jury questionnaire.’ ”) 
(quoting a district attorney). 
 238. Goldstein, supra note 192, at 603 (“With the knowledge that they are 
under the watchful eye of the court, jurors are less likely to discuss trials on their 
social networking sites.”). 
 239. See supra Parts I.A.1–2, I.B.2. 
 240. See supra notes 221–23 and accompanying text. 
 241. United States v. Blagojevich, 614 F.3d 287, 293 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (citations omitted). 
 242. Kay, supra note 223 (quoting litigator Dan Small). 
 243. See Elaine Silvestrini, Tampa Judge Threatens Jail for People Ignoring 
Jury Summons, TAMPA BAY ONLINE (Oct. 3, 2011), http://duke1.tbo.com/content/ 
2011/oct/03/041120/judge-threatens-jail-for-residents-who-ignored-jur/news-
breaking/. 
 244. See John E. Nowak, Jury Trials and First Amendment Values in “Cyber 
World,” 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 1213, 1225 (2001) (“The attorney with information 
about cyber activities of potential jurors will be able to use jury challenges for 
cause, and use preemptive challenges, in a strategically wise manner.”). 
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to reveal information uncovered about jurors; most 
jurisdictions reflect the views of the Jury Survey respondents 
and consider such information to be attorney work product.245 
Only a small number of states make information about jurors 
discoverable in criminal cases.246 The states that impose such a 
requirement, generally speaking, place the burden solely on the 
prosecution and only after a request from defense counsel.247 
Furthermore, the duty to disclose, in many instances, is limited 
to private information as opposed to publicly available 
information.248 Thus, it is highly unlikely that any information 
pertaining to juror misconduct will be disclosed through the 
discovery process. 
As for an attorney’s ethical obligation to reveal such 
information, the Rules of Professional Responsibility have not 
kept pace with technological advancements brought by the 
Digital Age. The most relevant rule of professional 
responsibility with respect to juror misconduct is Rule 3.3, 
Comment 12, which states: 
Lawyers have a special obligation to protect a tribunal 
against criminal or fraudulent conduct that undermines the 
 
 245. Jury Survey, supra note 36; see also Moskitis, supra note 141, at 630–33; 
Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Right of Defense in Criminal Prosecution to 
Disclosure of Prosecution Information Regarding Prospective Jurors, 86 A.L.R. 3D 
571 (1978). For cases not requiring the release of juror information obtained by 
the prosecutor to defense counsel, see, for example, Monathan v. State, 294 So. 2d 
401, 402 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); State v. Jackson, 450 So. 2d 621, 628 (La. 
1984); Martin v. State, 577 S.W.2d 490, 491 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). 
 246. See, e.g., People v. Murtishaw, 631 P.2d 446, 465 (Cal. 1981), rev’d on 
other grounds sub nom. Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(finding that judges may permit discovery of juror information obtained by 
opposing counsel); State v. Bessenecker, 404 N.W.2d 134, 138–39 (Iowa 1987) 
(holding that a juror “rap sheet” can be discoverable in certain circumstances); 
Commonwealth v. Smith, 215 N.E.2d 897, 901 (Mass. 1966) (finding that 
information about prospective jurors obtained by the police should be available to 
both parties). 
 247. See, e.g., Bessenecker, 404 N.W.2d at 138–39 (limiting access to juror 
information obtained by county attorneys and requiring county attorneys to 
disclose to the defense any information obtained). 
 248. See, e.g., State v. Beckwith, 344 So. 2d 360, 370 (La. 1977) (holding that 
the prosecution was not required to disclose a compilation of prospective jurors’ 
voting records where there was no evidence that such information was 
unavailable to the defendant through independent means); State v. Matthews, 
373 S.E.2d 587, 590–91 (S.C. 1988) (holding that the prosecution was not required 
to disclose results of investigation into potential jurors’ backgrounds where 
defense counsel had an opportunity on voir dire to explore jurors’ “backgrounds, 
attitudes, and characteristics”). 
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integrity of the adjudicative process, such as bribing, 
intimidating or otherwise unlawfully communicating with a 
witness, juror, court official or other participant in the 
proceeding, unlawfully destroying or concealing documents 
or other evidence or failing to disclose information to the 
tribunal when required by law to do so.
249
 
In applying Rule 3.3, Comment 12, to the Facebook post of 
the Michigan juror discussed in Part I,250 neither the defense 
attorney nor the prosecution would have an ethical duty to 
present this information to the court. In that case, the defense 
attorney wanted to reveal the information discovered in the 
Facebook post because it was beneficial to her client to remove 
the juror.251 But the juror’s act was neither fraudulent nor 
criminal, although it was improper and sufficient to cause her 
removal.252 As that example illustrates, the current legal 
system lacks adequate safeguards to ensure that all 
disqualifying juror information is brought forward. 
C. Allowing Questions 
Allowing jurors to ask questions of witnesses would 
significantly reduce the detrimental impact of the Digital Age 
on jury service.253 This is because juror questions, like jury 
instructions, address the reasons that jurors commit 
misconduct.254 When jurors have their questions answered, 
 
 249. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 12 (2007). At least two 
states—New York and Tennessee—have more expansive rules. See TENN. RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(i) (2011) (“A lawyer who, prior to conclusion of the 
proceeding, comes to know of improper conduct by or toward a juror or a 
member of the jury pool shall report the improper conduct to the tribunal,” 
confidentiality requirements notwithstanding.); N.Y. Ethics Opinion, supra 
note 234. In addition, one court has held that “[i]t is unquestioned that each 
party has an obligation to report the incompetency of any juror upon discovery.” 
Cowden v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 423 A.2d 936, 938 (D.C. 1980). 
However, the Cowden decision has yet to be followed by any other court. 
 250. See supra notes 137–39 and accompanying text. 
 251. See supra notes 137–39 and accompanying text. 
 252. See supra notes 137–39 and accompanying text. 
 253. See Brickman et al., supra note 2, at 296 (“If jurors are turning to the 
Internet because they are confused by important ideas or terminology in a trial, it 
is in everyone’s best interest to forestall that by maximizing comprehension and 
minimizing confusion.”). 
 254. See supra Part I.A.1. Consider also the case of Commonwealth v. Cherry, 
where the defendant faced capital murder charges for killing his girlfriend’s 
infant child. After finding the defendant not guilty on the charge of first-degree 
murder, the jury retired for the day in order to consider involuntary manslaughter 
2012] JUROR MISCONDUCT IN THE DIGITAL AGE 447 
 
they become less confused and curious and have greater 
confidence in their verdicts.255 Prohibiting questions leads 
jurors to seek alternative avenues for information.256 
Admittedly, resolving issues like juror curiosity is no easy 
task.257 Many of the questions that arise from a juror’s 
inquiring mind cannot be answered directly due to restrictions 
imposed by rules of evidence and the constitutional protections 
guaranteed to parties and witnesses. This does not mean, 
however, that these questions should be ignored. 
For example, a juror might ask the court whether the 
defendant is presently incarcerated. It is unlikely that the 
judge would ever answer or pose such a highly prejudicial 
question. But the judge can use this situation to her advantage 
by turning it into a teaching point. The judge, even without 
going into the details of the question, can once again instruct 
the jury, including the juror who raised the question, that 
certain evidence must not be examined or considered by the 
jurors in order to protect the rights of the parties involved in 
the case.258 This timely re-education of the jury is important 
because answers to questions like the defendant’s incarceration 
status259 are easily accessible online.260 
 
and third-degree murder charges the next day. During the night, one juror 
researched the term “retinal detachment,” which was a key issue with respect to 
the injuries sustained by the infant. The juror’s online research resulted in the 
judge declaring a mistrial. Interestingly, this same juror wanted to ask questions 
during the trial, but the judge refused to allow questions. Sheena Delazio, 
Mistrial Declared in Baby’s Death, TIMES LEADER (Jan. 15, 2011), 
http://www.timesleader.com/news/Mistrial_declared_in_baby_rsquo_s_death_01-
14-2011.html. 
 255. See supra notes 66–103, 170–80 and accompanying text. 
 256. See supra notes 95–97 and accompanying text. 
 257. See Judge Dennis Sweeney (Retired), Social Media and Jurors, MD. B.J., 
Nov. 2010, at 44, 48 (arguing that, in addition to allowing jurors to ask questions, 
judges “should prompt counsel to consider answering the obvious questions 
presented instead of leaving them open”). 
 258. Robert F. Forston, Sense and Non-sense: Jury Trial Communication, 1975 
BYU L. REV. 601, 630 (stating that juror questioning would “pinpoint . . . areas of 
improper speculation and enable the trial judge to neutralize [its] effects by 
appropriate admonition”) (quoting Bertram Edises, One-Way Communications: 
Achilles’ Heel of the Jury System, 48 CAL. ST. B.J. 134, 137 (1973)). 
 259. See, e.g., Persons in Custody, MONTGOMERY COUNTY SHERIFF PHIL 
PLUMMER, http://www.mont.miamivalleyjails.org (last updated Sept. 17, 2011) 
(listing all inmates housed in the Montgomery County Jail in Ohio by name). 
 260. Brickman et al., supra note 2, at 291 (“With the advent of the Internet 
and the ease with which it can be accessed anytime, anywhere, concerns about 
exposure to pre-trial or mid-trial information obtained outside of the courtroom 
and about juror use of such information take on a whole new dimension.”). 
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Besides reducing curiosity, allowing questions aids jurors 
in understanding the trial. Questions by jurors signal to the 
court and the attorneys what areas or topics are unclear and 
need further clarification. 261 This in turn reduces the need for 
jurors to speculate, conduct research, or contact outside third 
parties for information.262 
Finally, by asking questions, jurors become more confident 
in their verdicts.263 This is attributable to a variety of factors. 
First, jurors who ask questions are generally less passive and 
more attentive during trial.264 Second, questions and their 
answers decrease both speculation in the deliberation room and 
uncertainty about the verdict.265 
While some jurisdictions still do not allow jurors to pose 
questions, many are increasingly allowing them in both civil 
and criminal trials.266 This is not to say, however, that 
questions by jurors are routine. Most jurisdictions that allow 
jurors to submit written questions do so at the discretion of the 
judge, who also decides whether those questions will be posed 
to the witnesses.267 Thus, in some courts, jurors are not only 
kept in the dark about questions but also discouraged or 
 
 261. See Kim Smith, AZ Jurors Are Given Bigger Say in Trials, ARIZ. DAILY 
STAR (Feb. 28, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://azstarnet.com/news/local/article_c3c684dc-
f816-512e-b4cb-a5814300f65e.html. 
 262. See Brickman et al., supra note 2, at 298 (“The more they understand 
what they hear in court, the less motivated they may be to do Internet research 
for clarification.”). 
 263. See Judge John R. Stegner, Why I Let Jurors Ask Questions in Criminal 
Trials, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 541, 543 (2004). See generally Steven Penrod & Larry 
Heuer, Tweaking Commonsense: Assessing Aids to Jury Decision Making, 3 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 259 (1997). 
 264. B. Michael Dann & Valerie P. Hans, Recent Evaluative Research on Jury 
Trial Innovations, CT. REV., Spring 2004, at 12, 15. 
 265. Id. (citing various studies discussing the positive attributes of allowing 
juror questions). “The overwhelming majority of jurors felt that being allowed to 
put their questions to witnesses improved their role as decision makers . . . . 
When asked how the question procedure helped, almost 75% of jurors answered 
that the procedure helped them better understand the evidence.” Id. 
 266. See Nancy S. Marder, Answering Jurors’ Questions: Next Steps in Illinois, 
41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 727, 747 (2010); see also Martin A. Schwartz, Selected 
Evidence Issues Illustrated—Recent Decisions, Famous Trials, Movies and Novels, 
855 PRACTISING L. INST. 19, 147–52 (2011); Colleen Jenkins, Change Lets Jurors 
Submit Questions for Trial Witnesses, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Jan. 4, 2008), 
http://www.sptimes.com/2008/01/04/State/Change_lets_jurors_su.shtml (“The 
tweaks in the state’s jury system follow a nationwide trend toward fuller 
participation by the citizen deciders of fact.”). 
 267. See State v. Fisher, 789 N.E.2d 222, 226–28 (Ohio 2003) (reviewing court 
holdings on juror questioning in various jurisdictions). 
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prevented from asking them.268 This is unfortunate because 
jurors who are permitted to ask questions “feel more involved 
in the trial” and report an enhanced satisfaction with their jury 
service.269 
Contrary to the growing national trend of allowing 
questions by jurors, few Jury Survey respondents 
recommended this practice for combating improper juror 
research and communications.270 In fact, few Jury Survey 
respondents thought this specific reform proposal would 
decrease or prevent juror misconduct. Some Jury Survey 
respondents went so far as to question the connection between 
juror questions and misconduct.271 Others thought that 
questions by jurors would cause the judge to lose control of the 
courtroom. For example, one Jury Survey respondent wrote 
that she was “[n]ot certain [that allowing juror questions] 
would help—a judge couldn’t be certain where this would 
lead.”272 This response indicates a lack of familiarity with how 
jurors ask questions in court. 
In the courts that allow juror questions, the normal 
procedure is as follows: At the conclusion of a witness’s 
testimony, the judge asks the jurors whether they have any 
questions.273 If the jurors do have questions, they write them 
down and then hand them to the bailiff, who gives the 
questions to the judge.274 The judge and the attorneys review 
the questions.275 The judge, after hearing any possible 
objections from the attorneys, then decides whether she will 
answer or pose the question to the witness.276 Thus, the 
concern about “where this would lead” appears to be 
unwarranted. Judges remain in control because they still serve 
as gatekeepers, monitoring how questions are handled and 
what information the jurors will receive. Judges lose control 
 
 268. Marder, supra note 266, at 747. 
 269. Dann & Hans, supra note 264, at 15. 
 270. Only six of forty-one Jury Survey respondents recommended allowing 
jurors to ask questions. Jury Survey, supra note 36. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Barry A. Cappello & James G. Strenio, Juror Questioning: The Verdict Is 
In, TRIAL, June 2000, at 44, 48. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. 
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when jurors, after growing frustrated with the inability to ask 
questions, seek answers outside of the courtroom.277 
The views expressed by the Jury Survey respondents 
regarding juror questions may be attributed to the fact that 
they dislike the idea of allowing anyone else in the courtroom 
to ask questions.278 At present, only the judge and attorneys 
have the power to ask questions. By sharing this right with 
someone else, the judges and attorneys who participated in the 
Jury Survey might feel that they have lost some power or that 
jurors are now equal partners in the trial process.279 Also, the 
Jury Survey respondents may share some of the concerns 
raised by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals when it addressed 
the issue of jurors asking questions in United States v. Collins: 
There are a number of dangers inherent in allowing juror 
questions: jurors can find themselves removed from their 
appropriate role as neutral fact-finders; jurors may 
prematurely evaluate the evidence and adopt a particular 
position as to the weight of that evidence before considering 
all the facts; the pace of trial may be delayed; there is a 
certain awkwardness for lawyers wishing to object to juror-
inspired questions; and there is a risk of undermining 
litigation strategies.
280
 
The potential problems raised by the Sixth Circuit and 
Jury Survey respondents regarding juror questions must be 
examined in the context of what now occurs when jurors are 
not allowed to pose questions. Jurors go elsewhere and seek 
answers through alternative means. According to Professor 
Nancy Marder, jurors who are not afforded the opportunity to 
ask questions during trial are more likely to engage in self-
 
 277. Macpherson & Bonora, supra note 176, at 43 (“However, allowing and 
even encouraging jurors to ask their questions in the courtroom is the best way to 
maintain control over the evidence they consider, as it will reduce—if not 
eliminate—the jurors’ motivation to get their questions answered online.”). 
 278. See Cappello & Strenio, supra note 273, at 48–49 (“Simply put, if a trial 
judge sitting as a trier of fact without a jury can ask questions, jurors should have 
the same right in the careful search for the truth.”). 
 279. See Smith, supra note 75, at 559 (“The fact that [juror questioning] is not 
more widely employed may be due to a basic distrust of juries on the part of 
judges and their fear that they will lose control of the trial process.”). 
 280. United States v. Collins, 226 F.3d 457, 461 (6th Cir. 2000). 
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help.281 And, unlike in the past, self-help in the Digital Age is 
easier for jurors to accomplish and more difficult for courts to 
discover.282 By denying jurors even the opportunity to seek 
answers to their questions in the presence of the judge, the 
court encourages them to look elsewhere and rely on 
alternative sources.283 
D. Improving Instructions 
The most obvious and popular solution for combating the 
negative influence of the Digital Age is to modernize jury 
instructions.284 This proposal received the greatest amount of 
support from the Jury Survey respondents.285 In addition, 
several courts have recently recommended improving 
instructions to jurors.286 Thus, the majority of Part II will be 
spent on this topic. 
The problem with relying on jury instructions is that they 
are only instructions—nothing more.287 In order for 
instructions to be effective, jurors must follow them. In the 
corruption trial of Mayor Sheila Dixon, the jurors, despite 
repeated admonitions by the judge to desist, continued to 
communicate via Facebook.288 Absent sequestering jurors and 
 
 281. MARDER, supra note 125, at 113 (“There are instances in which jurors 
have, on their own, made site visits or consulted reference books, the Internet, 
and lawyers who are not involved in the case.”) (footnote omitted). 
 282. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 283. See generally Macpherson & Bonora, supra note 176. 
 284. See King, supra note 32, at 2728. As Professor King notes, this interest in 
more specific jury instructions is not new: “Calls for more explicit instructions to 
jurors to keep out of mischief appeared as early as 1893 . . . .” Id. 
 285. Twenty-six of forty-one Jury Survey Respondents cited jury instructions 
as an effective method of decreasing online research and improper 
communications by jurors. Jury Survey, supra note 36. 
 286. See, e.g., United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 305 (3d Cir. 2011); State v. 
Mitchell, 252 P.3d 586, 591 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011) (“We encourage our PIK 
committee to consider a revision to the general instruction on juror 
communication along the lines of that utilized in New York.”); Superior Court of 
N.J., supra note 197 (“To avoid any similar instances from happening again, the 
court recommends the model instructions to the attention of The Supreme Court 
Committee on Model Criminal Jury Charges for a possible revision, which should 
make unquestionably clear the prohibition on juror research and outside 
materials is absolute.”). 
 287. People v. Jamison, No. 8042/06, 2009 WL 2568740, at *6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Aug. 18, 2009) (“No matter what the instructions may be, they are only as 
effective as the integrity of the juror who hears them.”). 
 288. Dixon Jurors Ignore Judge, Continue Facebook Posts, supra note 129. In 
another example, a federal judge warned jurors in a death-penalty trial forty-one 
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confiscating all of their communication devices, which is both 
burdensome and expensive, no surefire methods exist to ensure 
compliance.289 Thus, jury instructions must be written in such 
a manner as to create the optimum atmosphere for acceptance. 
1. Component Parts 
One way to increase the likelihood of adherence is to use 
language easily understood by jurors.290 This includes avoiding 
overly technical terms and offering descriptions of improper 
conduct.291 Some jurors violate the rules against conducting 
improper research because the instructions in place either are 
unclear or do not specifically address the technological 
advancements ushered in by the Digital Age.292 For instance, 
although jurors are told in their initial summons not to “gather 
any evidence” about the case, some nevertheless look up the 
name of a party on the Internet.293 To those jurors, “gathering 
evidence” may mean going to the library or the actual crime 
scene, not necessarily performing a name or image search on 
Google.294 This has caused some judges to “go beyond the 
current boilerplate instructions to jurors and specifically 
include references to the Internet and social media.”295 
 
times not to discuss the trial with outside third parties, yet the jury foreperson 
still contacted the press about the case prior to the end of the trial. See United 
States v. Basham, 561 F.3d 302, 316–21 (4th Cir. 2009); Mark Sherman, Kagan: 
No Need for Court Review of Rogue Juror, WASH. TIMES (May 31, 2010), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/may/31/kagan-no-need-court-review-
rogue-juror. 
 289. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 290. Russo v. Takata Corp., 774 N.W.2d 441, 450 n.* (S.D. 2009) (“We suggest 
circuit courts consider using simpler and more direct language in the [jury] 
summons to indicate that no information about the case or the parties should be 
sought out by any means, including via computer searches. This type of 
admonishment is warranted given the ease with which anyone can obtain 
information via the internet . . . .”). 
 291. See Zemlicka, supra note 221 (“Judges admit there is little they can do to 
completely keep jurors from avoiding electronic communication, which is why 
many stress the potential problems that even inane interaction can create.”). 
 292. See id. (“I think people know they can’t go home and talk to their wife 
about a case, but they don’t think anything about firing off a bunch of texts . . . . 
That is why you have to state it explicitly.”) (quoting a judge). 
 293. See, e.g., Russo, 774 N.W.2d at 452. 
 294. See id.; see also Sweeney, supra note 202, at 3 (“[A] deliberating juror 
conducted an on-line search for the terms ‘livor mortis’ and ‘algor mortis’ on 
Wikipedia . . . . When asked about it, the juror said, ‘To me that wasn’t research. 
It was a definition.’ ”). 
 295. Browning, supra note 98. 
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Similar issues arise with instructions about improper juror 
communications.296 According to one legal commentator, 
“People tend to forget that e-mail, twittering, updating your 
status on Facebook is also speech . . . . There’s an impersonality 
about it because it’s a one-way communication—but it is a 
communication.”297 Therefore, for jury instructions to be 
effective, they have to reflect the new methods by which 
members of society communicate and interact. 
In addition to being told what they cannot do, jurors need 
to know why it is impermissible.298 Several Jury Survey 
respondents echoed this belief, with one respondent stating 
that jury instructions are “effective, if . . . the reason for the 
rule is explained.”299 Providing the “why” is important because 
jurors in the Digital Age are more receptive to learning 
information online.300 Moreover, many jurors today feel 
comfortable using technology to discover facts for themselves or 
communicate with others.301 As a result, it is a challenge to get 
these jurors to give up their methods of learning and acquiring 
 
 296. See Jason Cato, Burgeoning Social Networking System Has Legal 
Community in a Twitter, PITTSBURGH TRIB.-REV. (Feb. 8, 2010), 
http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/news/pittsburgh/print_666211.ht
ml. 
 297. Greg Moran, Revised Jury Instructions: Do Not Use the Internet, SIGN ON 
SAN DIEGO (Sept. 13, 2009, 2:00 AM), http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/2009/ 
sep/13/revised-jury-instructions-do-not-use-internet (quoting professor Julie 
Cromer Young); see also Trish Renaud, Watch out for Blogging Jurors, LAW TECH. 
NEWS (Feb. 17, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN. 
jsp?id=1202428284825 (paid subscription) (quoting a juror posting on his blog, 
“Hey guys! I know jurors aren’t supposed to talk about their trial, but nobody said 
they couldn’t LIVE-BLOG it, right?”). 
 298. Diane Jennings, Dallas Judges Take Pains to Keep Web from 
Undermining Fair Trials, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Jan. 30, 2010), 
http://www.dallasnews.com/news/community-news/dallas/headlines/20100130-
Dallas-judges-take-pains-to-keep-8754.ece (“Courts have to explain to people why, 
not just tell people, ‘Don’t read the newspaper, don’t do your own research and 
don’t Twitter’ . . . . Explain the rationale behind it.”) (quoting an attorney); see 
also Macpherson & Bonora, supra note 176, at 42 (“To get through to jurors who 
can’t quite believe that the judge really means no communication and no research, 
the judicial admonition needs to do more than ‘just say no.’ Social science research 
on persuasion has demonstrated that compliance can be measurably increased by 
simply adding the word ‘because’ and some type of explanation.”). 
 299. Jury Survey, supra note 36. 
 300. See Christopher Hope, Web-Savvy Young Make Bad Jurors Because They 
Cannot Listen, Says Lord Chief Justice, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 6, 2008, 7:33 PM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/3393061/Web-savvy-
young-make-bad-jurors-because-they-cannot-listen-says-Lord-Chief-Justice.html. 
 301. Id. 
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information and adhere to the court’s instructions.302 According 
to two well-known trial consultants, “The deeply ingrained 
habit of . . . resolving even minor factual disputes by getting 
instant answers online makes it difficult to accept the 
prohibition on doing so when confronted with a truly important 
decision.”303 To make the court’s task easier, jurors need to be 
told why practices that they regularly rely on are incompatible 
with jury service.304 
While a long discourse on due process is unnecessary, 
jurors need to know that information obtained outside of the 
courtroom cannot be considered when deciding a verdict 
despite how inconsequential or helpful the information may 
seem.305 Jurors should be told that, to ensure fairness in the 
trial process, the parties must have the opportunity to refute, 
explain, or correct the information jurors receive.306 According 
to Ohio Supreme Court Justice Judith Ann Lanzinger: 
One of the things we as judges need to do is explain why 
[the rules of evidence are] so important . . . . We’re not 
trying to keep the truth from anyone—pull the wool over 
anyone’s eyes. The rules of evidence are there for a reason to 
make sure both sides get a fair trial.
307
 
Failure to provide an explanation of the court’s instructions not 
only decreases the likelihood of juror compliance but also 
creates mistrust of the judicial system.308 
In addition to providing the rationale behind the 
instructions, judges must advise jurors of the negative 
 
 302. See Macpherson & Bonora, supra note 176, at 42 (“Many jurors under 40 
are used to keeping their electronic devices close at hand and ignoring any 
authority figure who attempts to impose prohibitions on their access to the 
Internet.”). 
 303. Id. 
 304. According to one Jury Survey Respondent, jury instructions can be 
effective if “given forcefully but fairly and [if] the reason for the rule is explained.” 
Jury Survey, supra note 36. 
 305. See Brickman et al., supra note 2, at 297 (“Judges can acknowledge the 
temptations of Internet research, but then can explain to jurors why their 
cooperation in refraining from extrinsic research is so vitally important to the 
fairness of the judicial system.”). 
 306. See supra Part I.A. 
 307. Jacob Lammers, Courts Adapting to Technology, NEWS-HERALD (June 13, 
2010), http://www.news-herald.com/articles/2010/06/13/news/nh2621582.txt. 
 308. See Gareth S. Lacy, Untangling the Web: How Courts Should Respond to 
Juries Using the Internet for Research, 1 REYNOLDS CTS. & MEDIA L.J. 167, 178 
(2011). 
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consequences of ignoring them.309 This starts by reminding 
jurors that disregarding the court’s instructions is a violation of 
their oath.310 Next, jurors should be told that failure to abide 
by these rules may cause the court to declare a mistrial, which 
is costly both in financial terms and in the emotional toll it 
takes on those involved in the process.311 Also, jurors need to be 
informed of the potential for contempt of court and the 
subsequent penalties assessed to jurors who violate the court’s 
instructions.312 
Adding a self-policing section will also encourage 
compliance with jury instructions.313 While some jurisdictions 
have shied away from this approach for fear of creating 
distrust and apprehension among jurors,314 jury instructions 
should include language requiring jurors to report fellow jurors 
for failing to follow the rules of the court.315 This watch-dog 
 
 309. Artigliere et al., supra note 38, at 14 (“Some judges tell jurors why it is 
important to follow the instructions. Many jurors respond better to direction if 
they understand the reason the requirement has been placed on them.”). 
 310. The value of the oath was recently illustrated in the first trial of former 
Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich. Holdout Juror in Blagojevich Case Explains 
Her Reasoning, STLTODAY.COM (Aug. 28, 2010, 12:00 AM), http:// 
www.stltoday.com/news/national/article_f803c33c-18ef-5244-be18-
7235b1fc26a5.html (“[S]tanding her ground in the jury room was not easy. Other 
jurors have acknowledged pressuring [the holdout] to change her vote on the 
Senate seat. . . . One person asked the judge for a copy of the juror’s oath, 
implying that [the holdout] wasn’t fulfilling her obligation.”). 
 311. Judge Margaret R. Hinkle, Criminal Practice in Suffolk Superior Court, 
BOS. B.J., Nov.–Dec. 2007, at 6, 6 (“With a jury impasse, not only do jurors feel a 
sense of incompleteness, but any mistrial imposes an enormous emotional and 
financial cost on the prosecution, the defense, the victim and the 
Commonwealth.”). 
 312. See Fallon, supra note 31, at 967. 
 313. See Artigliere et al., supra note 38, at 14 (“Another tactic is to ‘empower’ 
all jurors to report transgression by informing them of their duty to report any 
violation of the court’s instructions, including any communication of any juror 
with the outside about the case or any attempt to bring into court information 
from outside the trial.”); see also Edward T. Swaine, Note, Pre-deliberations Juror 
Misconduct, Evidential Incompetence, and Juror Responsibility, 98 YALE L.J. 187, 
201 (1988). 
 314. Michigan proposed a rule on electronic device usage by jurors that 
contained a requirement for jurors to report other jurors who violate the court’s 
instructions. Correy Stephenson, Michigan Considers Rule on Juror Device Use, 
ALLBUSINESS (May 12, 2009), http://www.allbusiness.com/legal/evidence-
witnesses/12333409-1.html (paid subscription). This requirement was later 
removed. See Order: Amendment of Rule 2.511 of the Michigan Court Rules, MICH. 
SUPREME CT. (June 30, 2009), http://courts.michigan.gov/supremecourt/Resources/ 
Administrative/2008-33.pdf. 
 315. Daniel William Bell, Note, Juror Misconduct and the Internet, 38 AM. J. 
CRIM. L. 81, 97 (2010) (“Courts should conclude their preliminary instructions by 
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requirement is necessary because juror misconduct is difficult 
to detect and prevent.316 An added benefit of this rule is that if 
a juror violates the court’s instructions, for example by 
researching the case or communicating with a third party, she, 
for fear of being reported to the court, is less likely to reveal her 
findings to other jurors and thereby taint the entire jury.317 
Besides the actual substance of the jury instructions, there 
are procedural questions such as when they should be given 
and how often.318 As indicated in Part I, improper research and 
communications by jurors occur at all stages of the trial, 
including immediately upon receiving a jury summons.319 
Thus, the earlier the instructions are given to jurors—for 
example, in the jury summons or upon initial arrival at the 
courthouse—the greater the chance for compliance. As for 
frequency, several Jury Survey respondents stated that 
instructions should be repeated as often as possible320 because 
they are easily forgotten.321 This repetition usually comes in 
the form of brief reminders during breaks in trial.322 Legal 
commentators have also recommended that jurors be provided 
with the instructions prior to starting deliberations.323 
Another procedural recommendation involves having 
jurors sign an oath or affidavit acknowledging the 
instructions.324 The Jury Survey respondents were split on the 
benefits of this proposal. One felt that, “[i]f jurors commit to 
signing [a] declaration, they are more likely to not violate that 
commitment.”325 Another stated that “actually sign[ing] a 
 
telling the jurors that they have a responsibility to inform the court of any 
misconduct that they witness.”). 
 316. Strutin, supra note 52 (“The hallowed ground of jury deliberations makes 
it difficult to unearth, preserve and authenticate surreptitious electronic 
communications and Web postings or to seek redress when they are uncovered.”). 
 317. Brickman et. al., supra note 2, at 298. 
 318. Artigliere et al., supra note 38, at 14. 
 319. See, e.g., Russo v. Takata Corp., 774 N.W.2d 441, 444 (S.D. 2009). 
 320. Jury Survey, supra note 36 (“Because it is repetitive and comes from the 
judge I believe this is effective.”). 
 321. One Jury Survey respondent stated, “This is o.k. but would be forgotten 
during the time delay from summons and jury duty. Moreover, it is more effective 
when the jurors hear it from the judge.” Id.; see also Bell, supra note 315, at 91 
(“Perhaps in part because Internet activity is such an integral, reflexive part of 
many Americans’ lives, some judges not only give . . . instructions [not to use the 
Internet] at the inception of trial, but also repeat them before each recess.”). 
 322. Artigliere et al., supra note 38, at 14. 
 323. JURORS: THE POWER OF 12, supra note 118, at 8–9. 
 324. See Moran, supra note 297. 
 325. Jury Survey, supra note 36. 
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document may verify to them the importance.”326 Another 
opposed such a policy, stating that “[w]e can’t turn jury duty 
into a check list of things sworn to.”327 And yet another 
respondent believed that this step is unnecessary if the judge 
addresses the issue early in voir dire.328 
At present, this Article does not favor requiring jurors to 
sign an affidavit or contract stating that they will abide by the 
jury instructions. Obtaining the juror’s signature would 
probably heighten juror awareness about the importance of 
following instructions; however, it seems overly formalistic. 
Jurors should not have to enter into written agreements with 
the court to fulfill their civic responsibilities. Furthermore, it 
may not be necessary if the other suggestions recommended in 
this Article are implemented. Moreover, taking such action 
may lead jurors to falsely believe that these instructions are 
superior or more important than all other instructions given to 
them by the court. 
Finally, certain jurors are going to ignore the court’s 
instructions regardless of how well they are written and 
delivered.329 For example, some jurors feel compelled to 
chronicle every aspect of their life online or learn the entire 
story about the case prior to rendering a verdict.330 To help 
deal with these so-called rogue jurors, attorneys or preferably 
the judge should ask all jurors during voir dire about their 
online presence and their ability to limit their use of the 
Internet during the trial.331 On occasion, straightforward and 
direct questions are quite revealing, as some potential jurors 
make their inability to follow court rules quite clear.332 
 
 326. Id. 
 327. Id. 
 328. See id. 
 329. Strutin, supra note 52 (“Sharing the minutest details of our lives through 
mobile telecommunications has become second nature in the Information Age.”). 
 330. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 331. See Judge Linda F. Giles, Does Justice Go Off Track When Jurors Go 
Online?, BOS. B.J., Spring 2011, at 7, 8–9 (“At the risk of sounding like a Luddite, 
it seems to me that succumbing to the temptation of technology and allowing 
jurors to go rogue is not the solution.”); Allison, supra note 97 (“I find that judges 
are asking now during voir dire whether jurors have a blog and what the name of 
the blog is . . . . If you get that commitment from the juror upfront, you’re more 
likely to avoid problems down the line.”) (quoting a trial consultant). 
 332. Ross, supra note 27. Ross cites the following example: 
In Kansas City, attorney Peter Carter asked potential jurors during voir 
dire if they would follow instructions not to do Internet research. In 
response, about six to 10 said that they would not. Carter also 
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In addition to weeding out jurors who refuse to follow the 
judge’s instructions, these questions help educate jurors and 
give them early notice about court prohibitions. They let the 
juror know that some habits such as blogging or looking up 
information on the Internet that are viewed as normal and 
inconsequential during everyday life can have profound and 
harmful consequences when conducted during jury duty. Also, 
early questioning alerts the court and attorneys to those jurors 
who might regularly blog or visit social media websites. This in 
turn facilitates online monitoring of juror activity.333 
Numerous jurisdictions have updated or are in the process 
of updating their jury instructions to address the new methods 
by which jurors communicate and research.334 Many of the 
updates include the suggestions mentioned above. This Article 
will now examine two sample jury instructions—one from 
Multnomah County, Oregon335 and the other from the Judicial 
Conference Committee on Court Administration and Case 
Management (Judicial Conference Committee) of the federal 
courts—to see how well these instructions adhere to the 
previously discussed recommendations. 
2. Sample Instructions 
a. Multnomah County, Oregon 
Do not discuss this case during the trial with anyone, 
including any of the attorneys, parties, witnesses, your 
friends, or members of your family. “No discussion” also 
means no emailing, text messaging, tweeting, blogging or 
 
discovered, simply by asking, that some six or seven of the 80 potential 
jurors already had researched the case on the Internet. 
Id. 
 333. See supra Part II.B. 
 334. Even the military is getting into the act. See Kent Harris, Jury 
Instructions to Include Rules on Use of New Media, STARS & STRIPES (June 21, 
2009), http://www.stripes.com/news/jury-instructions-to-include-rules-on-use-of-
new-media-1.92649 (noting that, following cases of juror misconduct, a military 
judge “said he’s been working on specific language addressing networking 
phenomena such as Twitter and Facebook that judges would use when instructing 
troops who sit on court-martial panels”). For a comprehensive overview of the 
various instructions across the country, see Robinson, supra note 203. 
 335. Of the jury instructions surveyed at the time this Article was written, 
Multnomah County, Oregon, along with New York, appeared to have the most 
comprehensive instructions addressing juror research and communications in the 
Digital Age. 
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any other form of communication. Do not discuss this case 
with other jurors until you begin your deliberations at the 
end of the case. Do not attempt to decide the case until you 
begin your deliberations. 
I will give you some form of this instruction every time 
we take a break. I do that not to insult you or because I do 
not think you are paying attention, but because, in my 
experience, this is the hardest instruction for jurors to 
follow. I know of no other situation in our culture where we 
ask strangers to sit together watching and listening to 
something, then go into a little room together and not talk 
about the one thing they have in common[:] what they just 
watched together. 
There are at least two reasons for this rule. The first is 
to help you keep an open mind. When you talk about things, 
you start to make decisions about them and it is extremely 
important that you not make any decisions about this case 
until you have heard all the evidence and all the rules for 
making your decisions, and you won’t have that until the 
very end of the trial. The second reason for the rule is that 
we want all of you working together on this decision when 
you deliberate. If you have conversations in groups of two or 
three during the trial, you won’t remember to repeat all of 
your thoughts and observations for the rest of your fellow 
jurors when you deliberate at the end of the trial. 
Ignore any attempted improper communication. If any 
person tries to talk to you about this case, tell that person 
that you cannot discuss the case because you are a juror. If 
that person persists, simply walk away and report the 
incident to my staff. 
Do not make any independent personal investigations 
into any facts or locations connected with this case. Do not 
look up any information from any source, including the 
Internet. Do not communicate any private or special 
knowledge about any of the facts of this case to your fellow 
jurors. Do not read or listen to any news reports about this 
case or about anyone involved in this case. 
In our daily lives we may be used to looking for 
information on-line and to “Google” something as a matter 
of routine. Also, in a trial it can be very tempting for jurors 
to do their own research to make sure they are making the 
correct decision. You must resist that temptation for our 
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system of justice to work as it should. I specifically instruct 
that you must decide the case only on the evidence received 
here in court. If you communicate with anyone about the 
case or do outside research during the trial it could cause us 
to have to start the trial over with new jurors and you could 
be held in contempt of court.
336
 
b. Judicial Conference Committee 
Before Trial 
You, as jurors, must decide this case based solely on 
the evidence presented here within the four walls of this 
courtroom. This means that during the trial you must not 
conduct any independent research about this case, the 
matters in the case, and the individuals or corporations 
involved in the case. In other words, you should not consult 
dictionaries or reference materials, search the internet, 
websites, blogs, or use any other electronic tools to obtain 
information about this case or to help you decide the case. 
Please do not try to find out information from any source 
outside the confines of this courtroom. 
Until you retire to deliberate, you may not discuss this 
case with anyone, even your fellow jurors. After you retire 
to deliberate, you may begin discussing the case with your 
fellow jurors, but you cannot discuss the case with anyone 
else until you have returned a verdict and the case is at an 
end. I hope that for all of you this case is interesting and 
noteworthy. I know that many of you use cell phones, 
Blackberries, the internet and other tools of technology. You 
also must not talk to anyone about this case or use these 
tools to communicate electronically with anyone about the 
case. This includes your family and friends. You may not 
communicate with anyone about the case on your cell 
phone, through e-mail, Blackberry, iPhone, text messaging, 
or on Twitter, through any blog or website, through any 
internet chat room, or by way of any other social networking 
websites, including Facebook, My Space, LinkedIn, and 
YouTube. 
 
 336. Jury Instructions, MULTNOMAH COUNTY, OR. (2009), available at 
http://bit.ly/cb3y3a [hereinafter Multnomah County Jury Instructions]. 
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At the Close of the Case 
During your deliberations, you must not communicate 
with or provide any information to anyone by any means 
about this case. You may not use any electronic device or 
media, such as a telephone, cell phone, smart phone, 
iPhone, Blackberry or computer; the internet, any internet 
service, or any text or instant messaging service; or any 
internet chat room, blog, or website such as Facebook, My 
Space, LinkedIn, YouTube or Twitter, to communicate to 
anyone any information about this case or to conduct any 
research about this case until I accept your verdict.
337
 
c. Analysis 
Both instructions avoid overly complex language and 
appear to be drafted with the layperson in mind. For example, 
they do not use technical terms or legal homonyms.338 A juror 
would not need any legal training to understand these 
instructions. In addition, each instruction specifically 
references the prohibition against using both old and new 
forms of communication to discuss the case. 
Also, each instruction offers specific examples of 
inappropriate conduct. Surprisingly, many jurors are still 
 
 337. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM. ON COURT ADMIN. & CASE MGMT., 
PROPOSED MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: THE USE OF ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGY TO 
CONDUCT RESEARCH ON OR COMMUNICATE ABOUT A CASE (2009) [hereinafter 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM. INSTRUCTIONS], available at http:// 
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/News/2010/docs/DIR10-018-Attachment.pdf. These 
instructions have been endorsed by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. United 
States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 305 (3d Cir. 2011) (“We enthusiastically endorse 
these instructions and strongly encourage district courts to routinely incorporate 
them or similar language into their own instructions.”). 
 338. See Peter Tiersma, The Rocky Road to Legal Reform: Improving the 
Language of Jury Instructions, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1081, 1101–02 (2001) (“One of 
the most obvious problems with jury instructions, or any other legal language that 
is meant to be understood by the general public, is technical vocabulary. Some 
legal terms are completely unknown in ordinary language, like quash or expunge 
or res gestae. Others, which I have elsewhere called legal homonyms, are ordinary 
words but have a specific legal meaning. Examples include brief, burglary, 
mayhem, complaint, notice, aggravation, and many others. Legal homonyms are 
potentially dangerous because a layperson may think that he knows what they 
mean, whereas the terms may mean something quite different in the law.”) 
(footnote omitted). 
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unsure of what activities run afoul of court rules.339 Examples 
help connect the instructions to everyday juror behavior. Some 
judges even go beyond the standard instructions and take it 
upon themselves to demonstrate how seemingly innocent 
online communications can jeopardize a trial.340 This is 
important because jurors need to understand that routine 
practices such as “Googling” individuals or discussing their 
lives on social media websites, which they have grown 
accustomed to and reliant on, have to be modified during jury 
duty. 
Of the two instructions, the Multnomah County 
instructions are superior to those of the Judicial Conference 
Committee. First, while both tell jurors not to research the case 
or discuss it until deliberations, the Multnomah County 
instructions explain, at least partially, why this rule is 
necessary. Jurors in the Digital Age, more so than in the past, 
need this explanation. Telling jurors why they should not 
engage in misconduct, even if only in broad terms, is important 
because it increases the likelihood that jurors will “buy in” and 
follow the instructions.341 While the Multnomah County 
instructions do a good job explaining why improper 
communications are deleterious, they do not go far enough with 
respect to research.342 Some states, such as Wisconsin, inform 
jurors that relying on outside information or conducting 
research “is unfair because the parties would not have the 
opportunity to refute, explain, or correct it.”343 
 
 339. Many jurors who are discovered conducting research claim that they did 
not know that they were doing anything wrong. In one Florida case, after the 
judge declared a mistrial because a juror went to Wikipedia to look up the terms 
“sexual assault” and “rape trauma syndrome,” the juror said, “I didn’t read about 
the case in the newspaper or watch anything on TV. . . . To me, I was just looking 
up a phrase.” Susannah Bryan, Davie Police Officer Convicted of Rape to Get New 
Trial, PALM BEACH POST (Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/ 
crime/davie-police-officer-convicted-of-rape-to-get-1126441.html; see also 
Zemlicka, supra note 221 (“But the situation served as a cautionary tale as to how 
even seemingly harmless online banter can potentially influence jurors and their 
verdict.”). 
 340. See Artigliere et al., supra note 38, at 14 (“Some judges are already 
enhancing the standard instructions on their own.”). 
 341. See supra notes 298–304 and accompanying text. 
 342. See Multnomah County Jury Instructions, supra note 336. 
 343. Social Networking, Jurors and Jury Instructions, WIS. LAW. (Feb. 2011), 
http://www.wisbar.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Wisconsin_Lawyer&template=/
CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&contentid=100316 (quoting Wisconsin Jury 
Instructions). 
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Also, the Multnomah County instructions, unlike those of 
the Judicial Conference Committee, define terms like 
“discussion” and how such terms are interpreted in the Digital 
Age. For example, the Multnomah County instructions explain 
to jurors that “discussion” includes “emailing, text messaging, 
tweeting, blogging or any other form of communication.”344 
This is important because many jurors think that “discussion” 
only concerns face-to-face conversations.345 
As for repetition, the Multnomah County instructions 
inform jurors that the judge “will give you some form of this 
instruction every time we take a break.”346 The Multnomah 
County instructions even address the conscientious juror who 
thinks that by knowing more she will be able to better fulfill 
her duties.347 The Multnomah County instructions make it 
clear to this type of juror that “it can be very tempting for 
jurors to do their own research to make sure they are making 
the correct decision. You must resist that temptation for our 
system of justice to work as it should.”348 
Finally, the Multnomah County instructions inform the 
juror that she might be held in contempt of court for violating 
the instructions. Although penalties should be a last resort to 
correct inappropriate behavior, they sometimes are 
necessary.349 Thus, courts should warn jurors that they may be 
penalized for misconduct. One Jury Survey respondent noted, 
“When a juror can sit in the privacy of their [sic] own home and 
find out info about the case they [sic] really need strong 
discouragement.”350 
The one superior aspect of the Judicial Conference 
Committee instructions is that they directly address the issue 
of jurors researching “individuals,” not just the facts or 
 
 344. Multnomah County Jury Instructions, supra note 336. 
 345. See Hannaford-Agor, supra note 60, at 45. According to Lake County 
Common Pleas Court Judge Vincent Culotta: “The definition of talk has changed. 
Talk now includes blogging, [posting] on [your] Facebook account, text messaging, 
e-mailing.” Lammers, supra note 307 (second alteration in original) (quoting 
Judge Culotta). 
 346. Multnomah County Jury Instructions, supra note 336. 
 347. According to one Jury Survey respondent, “Jurors want to do the right 
thing—that is a double-edged sword. They think the more info they have the 
better job they will do.” Jury Survey, supra note 36. 
 348. Multnomah County Jury Instructions, supra note 336. 
 349. See Pamela MacLean, Jurors Gone Wild, CAL. LAW. (Apr. 2011), 
http://www.callawyer.com/story.cfm?eid=914907&evid=1. 
 350. Jury Survey, supra note 36. 
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circumstances surrounding the case. For example, these 
instructions tell jurors not to “conduct any independent 
research about this case, the matters in the case, and the 
individuals or corporations involved in the case.”351 As 
illustrated in Russo v. Takata, jurors like to know the 
backgrounds of the parties in a particular case.352 Thus, jury 
instructions should address this issue. 
With respect to the negative features of both instructions, 
they lack the self-policing section advocated by some legal 
commentators.353 This additional safeguard is important in 
light of the secrecy and deference normally given to jury 
deliberations.354 Without this requirement, it is difficult to 
ensure that the instructions will be followed and that juror 
misconduct, if it occurs, will be discovered.355 Also, neither 
instruction specifically informs jurors that disobeying court 
rules violates the juror’s oath. This latter point was significant 
for at least one Jury Survey respondent.356 
 
 351. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM. INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 337. 
 352. See supra notes 103–10 and accompanying text. 
 353. Judge Dennis M. Sweeney (Retired), Worlds Collide: The Digital Native 
Enters the Jury Box, 1 REYNOLDS CTS. & MEDIA L.J. 121, 141 (2011) (“If you 
become aware that any other juror has violated this instruction, please also let me 
know by a note.”); see also Brickman et al., supra note 2 at 298. Several states also 
impose a duty on jurors to report misconduct by fellow jurors. A Tennessee jury 
instruction reads as follows: “Any juror who receives any information about this 
case other than that presented at trial must notify the court immediately.” 
Robinson, supra note 203, at 389 (2011) (quoting TENN. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, 
COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL), TENN. PATTERN JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS (2010)). “[T]he only way to ensure that deliberations are not 
tainted by information that shouldn’t be brought into the jury room is to ‘get 
jurors to police themselves.’ ” Porter, supra note 100, at 14 (quoting trial 
consultant Amy Singer). 
 354. See Zemlicka, supra note 221 (“Under [Judge] DiMotto’s instructions, a 
fellow juror would be responsible for reporting misconduct to the court.”). See 
generally Alison Markovitz, Note, Jury Secrecy During Deliberations, 110 YALE 
L.J. 1493 (2001). 
 355. Hirsch, supra note 21 (“Unless a juror informs the court that another 
juror has conducted internet research, or . . . the material is discovered, [juror 
research] is impossible to police.”) (quoting barrister Eleanor Laws); see, e.g., 
Altman v. Bobcat Co., 349 F. App’x 758, 760–61 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 356. Jury Survey, supra note 36. 
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3. Model Instructions 
a. Introduction to Model Instructions 
The model instructions created in this Article are an 
amalgamation of jury instructions from across the country.357 
They were created because no single jurisdiction had 
instructions that addressed all of the concerns raised by this 
Article. Hopefully, these instructions will serve as a model for 
jurisdictions that have yet to update their instructions or who 
feel that their updates were insufficient. In addition, these 
model instructions can be useful to practitioners who are 
concerned with jurors conducting improper research and 
communications.358 The instructions assume that the 
jurisdiction does not allow pre-deliberation discussions between 
jurors. If that is not the case, then these instructions would 
have to be slightly modified by removing or altering the section 
on pre-deliberation discussions. 
b. Text of Model Instructions 
Introduction: Serving on a jury is an important and 
serious responsibility. Part of that responsibility is to decide 
the facts of this case using only the evidence that the parties 
will present in this courtroom. As I will explain further in a 
moment, this means that I must ask you to do something that 
may seem strange to you: to not discuss this case or do any 
research on this case. I will also explain to you why this rule is 
necessary and what to do if you encounter any problems with 
it. 
Communications: During this trial, do not contact 
anyone associated with this case. If a question arises, direct it 
to my attention or the attention of my staff. Also, do not discuss 
this case during the trial with anyone, including any of the 
attorneys, parties, witnesses, your friends, or members of your 
family. This includes, but is not limited to, discussing your 
 
 357. These instructions also benefitted from the useful suggestions of Eric P. 
Robinson, Deputy Director of the Donald W. Reynolds Center for Courts and the 
Media at the University of Nevada at Reno. 
 358. The defense team representing Barry Bonds in his 2011 perjury trial used 
a modified version of these instructions. Howard Mintz, Jurors Must Lay Off 
Twitter, Facebook, iPhones and All Else for Barry Bonds Trial, OAKLAND TRIB., 
Mar. 5, 2011. 
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experience as a juror on this case, the evidence, the lawyers, 
the parties, the court, your deliberations, your reactions to 
testimony, exhibits, or any aspect of the case or your courtroom 
experience. “No discussion” extends to all forms of 
communication, whether in person, in writing, or through 
electronic devices or media such as: email, Facebook, MySpace, 
Twitter, instant messaging, Blackberry messaging, iPads, 
iPhones, iTouches, Google, Yahoo!, or any other Internet search 
engine or form of electronic communication for any purpose 
whatsoever, if it relates to this case. 
After you retire to deliberate, you may begin to discuss the 
case with your fellow jurors and only your fellow jurors. 
I will give you some form of this instruction every time we 
take a break. I do that not to insult you or because I don’t think 
that you are paying attention. I do it because, in my 
experience, this is the hardest instruction for jurors to follow. I 
know of no other situation in our culture where we ask 
strangers to sit together watching and listening to something, 
then go into a little room together and not talk about the one 
thing they have in common, that which they just watched 
together. There are at least three reasons for this rule. 
The first is to help you keep an open mind. When you talk 
about things, you start to make decisions about them, and it is 
extremely important that you not make any decisions about 
this case until you have heard all the evidence and all the rules 
for making your decisions, and you will not have heard that 
until the very end of the trial. The second reason is that, by 
having conversations in groups of two or three during the trial, 
you will not remember to repeat all of your thoughts and 
observations to the rest of your fellow jurors when you 
deliberate at the end of the trial. The third, and most 
important, reason is that by discussing the case before 
deliberations you increase the likelihood that you will either be 
influenced by an outside third party or that you will reveal 
information about the case to a third party. If any person tries 
to talk to you about this case, tell that person you cannot 
discuss the case because you are a juror. If that person persists, 
simply walk away and report the incident to me or my staff. 
Research: Do not perform any research or make any 
independent personal investigations into any facts, individuals, 
or locations connected with this case. Do not look up or consult 
any dictionaries or reference materials. Do not search the 
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Internet, websites, or blogs. Do not use any of these or any 
other electronic tools or other sources to obtain information 
about any facts, individuals, or locations connected with this 
case. Do not communicate any private or special knowledge 
about any facts, individuals, or locations connected with this 
case to your fellow jurors. Do not read or listen to any news 
reports about this case. The law prohibits a juror from 
receiving evidence not properly admitted at trial. If you have a 
question or need additional information, contact me or my 
staff. I, along with the attorneys, will review every request. If 
the information requested is appropriate for you to receive, it 
will be released in court. 
In our daily lives, we may be used to looking for 
information online and we may “Google” things as a matter of 
routine. Also, in a trial it can be very tempting for jurors to do 
their own research to make sure they are making the correct 
decision. However, the moment you try to gather information 
about this case or the participants is the moment you 
contaminate the process and violate your oath as a juror. 
Looking for outside information is unfair because the parties do 
not have the opportunity to refute, explain, or correct what you 
discovered or relayed. The trial process works through each 
side knowing exactly what evidence is being considered by you 
and what law you are applying to the facts you find. You must 
resist the temptation to seek outside information for our 
system of justice to work as it should. Once the trial ends and 
you are dismissed as jurors, you may research and discuss the 
case as much as you wish. You may also contact anyone 
associated with this case. [Questions by the judge to the jury: 
Are there any of you who cannot or will not abide by these 
rules concerning communication or research with others in any 
way during this trial? Are there any of you who do not 
understand these instructions?] 
Ramifications: If you communicate with anyone about 
the case or do outside research during the trial, it could lead to 
a mistrial, which is a tremendous expense and inconvenience to 
the parties, the court, and, ultimately, you as taxpayers. 
Furthermore, you could be held in contempt of court and 
subject to punishment such as paying the costs associated with 
having a new trial. If you find that one of your fellow jurors has 
conducted improper communications or research or if you 
conduct improper communications or research, you have a duty 
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to report it to me or my staff so that we can protect the 
integrity of this trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The Digital Age, with its advancements in technology, has 
made it easier for jurors to violate courts’ prohibitions against 
juror research and communications. This Article has suggested 
four possible solutions to combating this problem. The first two, 
increased penalties and greater monitoring of juror activity, 
take a somewhat paternalistic approach to the issue by 
treating jurors like children who need to be watched and 
punished when they fail to follow the rules. This course of 
action, while possibly beneficial in the short-term, may prove 
ineffective or harmful in the long-term. This is because these 
solutions only address the symptoms of juror misconduct, not 
its cause. Thus, courts will always be chasing the next 
technological advancement that facilitates juror research or 
communications. Second, and more importantly, these two 
proposals will discourage citizens from participating in jury 
service. 
In the alternative, the courts could take a more holistic 
view of the problem. Thus, rather than solely blame the jurors, 
courts could examine the trial process as a whole and attempt 
to eliminate the reasons for juror misconduct. This would 
require the courts to reconsider the type of information made 
available to jurors. As discussed earlier, many instances of 
juror misconduct can be traced to a juror’s desire for more 
information. Allowing juror questions will help curb this desire. 
This solution provides jurors with additional information while 
not violating the Rules of Evidence or the Constitution. It also 
allows courts to maintain control of what information jurors 
see and hear. 
Besides permitting questions, courts also need to improve 
jury instructions. Today’s instructions need to inform jurors 
that routine practices such as “Googling” individuals or 
discussing their own lives on social media websites, which they 
have grown accustomed to and reliant on, is incompatible with 
jury service. In providing these instructions, courts need to 
ensure that jurors know why such activity is prohibited. While 
some jurisdictions have updated their jury instructions to 
reflect the changes brought by the Digital Age, others have not. 
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In order to facilitate and encourage jurisdictions to re-examine 
and improve their instructions to jurors, this Article has 
created model instructions that will hopefully serve as a 
template for others to use. 
The jury, throughout its approximately 400-year history in 
America, has witnessed many changes and upheavals in the 
legal system. Through each one, the jury has adapted and 
survived. Thus, it is highly likely that the jury will weather the 
storm of the Digital Age. The question becomes: How will it 
evolve? This author hopes that any changes to the jury go 
towards empowerment, allowing jurors to function as equal 
partners in the courtroom. 
APPENDIX (JURY SURVEY QUESTIONS) 
1. Do you believe that jurors who access the Internet 
during trial to find out information about the pending case is a 
problem? If it is not a problem, please state why you feel this 
way. 
2. Do you or the court in which you sit359 have a policy or 
rule on jurors accessing the Internet while on jury duty? If you 
answer “No,” go to question #6. 
3. Can you briefly describe this policy or rule? 
4. How long has the rule or policy been in place? 
5. Do you think the policy or rule is effective? If not, what 
changes should be made? 
6. To date, have you had instances of jurors improperly 
accessing the Internet while on jury duty? If “Yes,” what action 
if any did you take as a result of the juror(s) accessing the 
Internet? 
7. Of the following suggestions which one do you think is 
most effective at preventing jurors from accessing the Internet? 
Please state why you believe this one is most effective. 
(a) Instruct jurors in the initial summons that they must 
refrain from accessing any information about the trial from the 
Internet. 
(b) Use voir dire questions that actually address Internet 
use by jurors. 
 
 359. The Jury Survey sent to federal prosecutors and defenders was very 
similar to the one in the Appendix. Slight changes were made in the language (for 
example, “which you sit” was changed to “where you practice”). 
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(c) Revise jury instructions with specific language about 
using the Internet during trial. Repeat these instructions 
throughout the trial. 
(d) Have jurors sign declarations stating that they will not 
use the Internet to research the trial. 
(e) Educate jurors about the importance of jurors deciding 
cases on the facts presented. 
(f) Make it clear that using the Internet to access 
information about the trial is a violation of the court’s 
instructions. 
(g) Allow questions by jurors. 
(h) Prohibit jurors from accessing items like cell phones, 
laptops etc. 
(i) Other (please describe). 
8. Do you have any additional views about jurors and the 
Internet not covered by this survey that you would like to 
discuss? 
9. Do you think it is appropriate for opposing parties to 
conduct Internet research on jurors? If yes, do you believe that 
such research should be turned over as part of the Discovery 
process? 
10. Do you think it is appropriate for jurors to 
communicate with one another online or otherwise prior to 
deliberations? 
